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Sustainable fiscal policy which is flexible in reacting to economic fluctuations may 
considerably contribute to long term, stable economic growth and promote monetary 
stability. The member states of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have 
established institutional incentives for promoting sustainable national fiscal policies. The 
Stability and Growth Pact sets out the maximum permitted rate of the national debt and 
the budget deficit, and requires a structurally balanced budget (cyclically adjusted deficit 
close to zero), for the purpose of establishing a sustainable budget, but also allowing 
adequate margin for counterbalancing potential shocks affecting the economy. 
Motivated by accession to the euro zone, most of the countries implemented significant 
adjustments, managing to reduce the budget deficit below the 3 per cent criterium in the 
reference period. The reduction of the deficit proved to be successful in the long term 
mostly in countries which decreased primary expenditure. Contrary to the above trend, 
adjustments based on tax increases were less successful, with the exception of countries in 
which the higher rate of revenue was the result of the widening of the tax base and not the 
raising of tax rates or the introduction of new taxes. It is particularly important whether in 
the course of adjustments, focus is on sustainable structural measures, promoting the 
improvement in quality and the reform of institutional solutions (e.g. introduction of rules 
on spending), or the fall in the deficit is only apparent and temporary, delaying a genuine 
adjustment and involving the clear risk of a reversal. 
In some countries with a large debt and high risk premium, the fall in the budget deficit 
was significantly related to the improvement in the interest balance, reaching 2-3 per cent 
of the GDP in a few countries in the final years (e.g. Italy, Portugal, Greece). According to 
the study, the improvement in the Hungarian interest balance will likely be considerably 
smaller than in the above acceding countries, due to the lower initial credit balance and the 
progressive state of interest convergence. According to estimates, the improvement in the 
interest balance may reduce the rate of the ESA deficit by a total of 0.5%-0.9% of the GDP 
by 2008. 
The study argues that the primary balance would worsen by 1 per cent of the GDP 
between 2004 and 2008 if, on the premise of no additional fiscal measures, only the known 
determinations and the expected balance of EU settlements are taken into account. If we 
also presume that obligations related to quasi-fiscal activities do not appear in the official 
deficit until 2008, then approximately 3 percentage points improvement is required in the 
primary balance, to achieve the 2.8 per cent deficit targeted for 2008 in the Convergence 
Program, updated in December of 2004. This means that if it is implemented through the 
reduction of expenditures, savings equalling 4 per cent of the GDP would have to be 
realised, taking the automatically lost tax amounts into consideration. 
The assumptions of the calculation also indicate risks related to the rate degree of the 
necessary adjustment. In relation to tax bases, the structure of economic growth will not 
likely be favourable, for wages and consumption will rise at a more moderate rate, thus the 
current level of revenue could fall. In respect of quasi-fiscal amounts, a two-sided risk 
arises with regard to the degree of the necessary adjustment. If the financing of past quasi-
fiscal activities (e.g. losses of state-owned companies) is indicated in the official deficit (e.g. 
in the form of debt assumption), a greater than expected fiscal adjustment would be 
required for the implementation of the set targets. On the other hand, the exclusion of 
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traditional state expenditures from the official deficit (e.g. through PPP solutions) can 
reduce the adjustment requirement in the short term. 
We wish to emphasise, however, that the increase in quasi-fiscal expenditures and the 
application of other accounting solutions only reduces the budget deficit on a statistical 
level, but does not improve either long term sustainability or the external balance; it does 
not produce a genuine and lasting adjustment. 
The above aspects also shift the quality of consolidation into focus; in addition to structural 
measures, institutional solutions are required which promote the lasting effect of results. 
For example, the consideration of quasi-fiscal amounts and the concurrent introduction of 
a rule limiting the rise in expenditures would enable the planning of a mid-term budget in a 
reliable framework. The application of the rule would also presume an internal accord 




Wide ranging theoretical consensus and practical experience suggest that prudent fiscal 
policy, as promoted by the countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union, may 
contribute to the long term and stable growth of the economy. In terms of fiscal policy, 
prudent behaviour is associated with establishing the ideal and sustainable rate of national 
debt which is fundamentally related to keeping the budget deficit within limits. In addition, 
fiscal policy may assume an important role in moderating short term fluctuations in the 
economy. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), defining limits to the fiscal policies of member 
states, comprises one of the foundations of the successful operation of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union. Countries of the euro zone determine fiscal policy on a 
national level, but governments planning for the short term may be prompted to adopt 
imprudent fiscal policies. The Pact sets the target of defining a simple, transparent and 
easily monitored system of rules which assures the prudent development of a national fiscal 
policy but limiting member countries the least in applying an ideal, flexible and 
independent fiscal policy. 
For the purpose of establishing the long term sustainability and the adequate flexibility of 
fiscal policy, Hungary must also draft budgets permanently complying with EMU 
requirements, with a view to establishing the structural balance in the long term. In the 
framework of an earlier study, the MNB published an analysis on fiscal challenges related 
to accession to the euro zone, and examined opportunities for convergence and 
stabilisation. 1 This study wishes to update the conclusions of the earlier analysis with the 
review of recent fiscal developments, supplementing these with additional aspects and 
international experience. 2
In Part I of the study, we will examine the general principles of ideal fiscal policy and 
analyse whether the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact pose real limits to member 
states adopting prudent and flexible fiscal policies. In addition, we will analyse Hungarian 
characteristics in respect of the long term sustainability of fiscal policy and its stabilising 
function. Part II of the study explores issues related fiscal consolidation. Firstly, we will 
review conclusions drawn from international experience in fiscal consolidation, particularly 
the adjustments made by the member states of the euro zone. The second part of the 
chapter (II.2) analyses possibilities of fiscal adjustment in Hungary, the implementation of 
which is required for long term fiscal sustainability, in accordance with the requirements of 
the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition to theoretical considerations and international 
experience, we examine the trends of the past years, analysing the options of budgetary 
policy in meeting the 3 per cent Maastricht deficit criterion required for accession to the 
euro zone, including means of reducing the deficit permanently. 
Our study focuses on the period 2004-2008; we will calculate the degree of adjustment 
required for reaching the deficit target defined in the convergence program. Thus, the 
calculations are based on the premise of a transitional phase in which the creative, quasi-
fiscal items are not included in the deficit. We are not examining challenges posed by the 
                                                 
1 Csajbók, A. and Csermely, Á. (2002), Chapters III.2.4 and V.1.1.  
2 The calculations were completed in November 2004, with the exception of estimates on interest 
expenditure. In respect of interest, we used information available in mid-January 2005. 
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necessity of further reduction of the deficit in the subsequent period. It is, however, 
important to emphasise that the adjustment requirement in the long term is increased by 
these creative items through payment obligations and debt assumptions, which are 
presently not reflected in official figures, but by way of which the deficit would have 
reached the steady rate of approximately 8 per cent of the GDP in the past years3. 
We hope that our study will call attention to economic policy measures which may 
contribute to Hungary becoming a competitive member state of the euro zone, developing 
at a rapid pace. 
II. Ideal fiscal policy: sustainability and stabilisation 
Wide ranging theoretical consensus and practical experience suggest that prudent fiscal 
policy, as promoted by the countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union, may 
contribute to the long term and stable growth of the economy. In terms of fiscal policy, 
prudent behaviour is associated with establishing the ideal and sustainable rate of national 
debt which is also fundamentally related to keeping the budget deficit within limits. In 
addition, fiscal policy may also assume an important role in counterbalancing short term 
fluctuations in the economy. 
When analysing the effects of the budget deficit, it is expedient to apply the premise that 
the volume of private investment in a given year may be financed through three major 
sources: in addition to a budget surplus, the savings of domestic economic participants and 
credit drawn abroad. The above financing identity is defined by the formula below: 
S+(T-G)=I+CA, 
where S indicates domestic savings, T-G the budget surplus, I investments and CA the 
current account surplus. We should note that interest paid on outstanding national debt 
increases the level of government expenditures (G), while interest paid on outstanding debt 
to foreign lenders raises the deficit in the current account (-CA). 
The economy’s aggregate amount of savings is determined by the sum (left side of formula) 
of private (S) and government savings (T-G). Thus, the direct effect of the budget deficit 
reduces the aggregate amount of savings. However, the indirect effect of the deficit through 
private savings may be considerable; the Keynesian and non-Keynesian approaches suggest 
significantly different results in this respect. The non-Keynesian or Ricardian approach 
essentially argues that consumers planning for the long term, with no financial constraints, 
will react to the rise in the deficit with a corresponding increase in the amount of their 
savings, therefore the deficit will not influence the aggregate amount of savings. This 
approach is based on the premise that consumers recognise that the deficit increases the 
national debt which they – or their descendants – must eventually refund through higher 
taxes; and such considerations urge them to start accumulate savings. Contrary to the 
above, the Keynesian approach presumes that the savings are determined by the disposable 
income of consumers, therefore the rise in the deficit generally leads to the decrease in the 
amount of aggregate savings. According to the consensus view, the presumptions and 
                                                 
3 In order to account for creative items, since 1998, the central bank has been regularly publishing the so-
called supplemented deficit (SNA). The related calculation methodology is explained in greater detail in the 
publication entitled “Manual to Hungarian Economic Statistics” 
(http://www.mnb.hu/dokumentumok/kezikonyv_magyar_gazd_hu.pdf). 
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conclusions of the Ricardian approach are too stringent; there is general agreement that the 
budget deficit induces the fall in aggregate savings in the short term. 4
A reduced rate of financing caused by the budget deficit can also be supplemented with the 
use of foreign funds which in turn increase the deficit of the current account (-CA). The 
above step may raise the amount of foreign debt, and the interest and installments of such 
amounts can reduce the disposable income of the country in the future. The excessive 
deficit in the current account may lead to concerns related to the sustainability of the 
balance of payments potentially leading to higher interest rates and the devaluation of the 
exchange rate. A prolonged deficit may also necessitate a domestic adjustment process 
involving higher interest rates in the long term and a revalued exchange rate, fulfilling the 
above identity through the moderation of investments (I) and the rise in domestic savings 
(S). 
Thus, a long term deficit may reduce the long term level of output and its growth through 
the increase of the long term interest rate. In addition, the interest rate may rise and the 
exchange rate fall further if market participants are of the view that fiscal policy 
superimposes short term objectives, in disregard of the limits of the long term sustainability 
of accumulated national debt. In reaction to the above, market participants may 
significantly raise the risk premium expected on their investments. It should also be noted 
that since the rate of national debt is generally determined nominally, the price level, 
inflation and nominal exchange rate affected by monetary policy also bears an impact on 
the sustainability of national debt. Consequently, imprudent fiscal policy poses a risk to 
monetary stability, as well, entailing the further increase of the rate of risk premium, for it 
may prompt monetary policy to inflate the debt or devalue the exchange rate, in case of 
limited independence of the central bank. 
Thus, a long term budget deficit and accumulating national debt may lead to the long term 
fall in the income of the country. Firstly, a growth sacrifice may be caused by crowding out 
private investment. Secondly, if the deficit is financed with external funds, contributing to 
the rising current account deficit and larger net foreign debt, the repayment of the debt and 
interest thereon will lead to the fall in the national income in the long term. 
Many European countries acquired valuable experience in recognising the importance of 
adopting prudent macroeconomic policies when confronting the period of the 1980s with 
high budget deficits, rising debts and low economic growth. In many instances, the 
persistently high deficit contributed to economic growth only to a very limited degree; the 
growing amount of debt added to the increasing strain on the budget, raising inflationary 
expectations and long term interest rates, and in many cases budgetary stringency was 
implemented in times when the easing of the budget would have been necessary for the 
purpose of economic stabilisation. 5
In addition to the rate of the deficit and debt, the quality related aspects of the budget also 
impact the effect of fiscal policy on long term growth.6 Under the term quality, we generally 
refer to the efficient use of available budget resources for defined strategic objectives. This 
definition refers to the minimisation of the distorting effects of the tax system, selection of 
priorities (education, research and development, modernisation of infrastructure) optimally, 
                                                 
4 In relation to the review and numerical estimate of the importance of various channels, see e.g. European 
Commission (2004), part III, and Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998). 
5 See e.g. Buti – Sapir (1998). 
6 See e.g. Public Finances in EMU (2004), chapter 4. 
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improving productivity in the long term, and the adequate establishment of the institutional 
framework of implementation. 
II. 1. Ideal level and path of national debt 
Determining the ideal proportion of national debt to output and its long term path comprises a 
decision requiring the consideration of various economic and social aspects; and their 
values may vary depending on national and periodic characteristics. Maintaining national 
debt allows the generational redistribution of the financing of budget expenditures. 
Sustaining debt, however, may cause various welfare costs which should be taken into 
account. A major problem may arise if credit-financed government expenditures reduce the 
stock of private capital through crowding out private investment. It reduces the level of 
long term output and the rate of growth, in case it is spent for government consumption or 
unproductive investments. Moreover, debt financing can be costly7, and if the figure is 
excessively high, it may become unsustainable as a result of major economic shocks. 8
Thus, long term sustainability is a fundamental factor in the determination of the ideal level 
of national debt: the instalments and interest should not pose a burden for the government 
– even upon major macroeconomic or demographic shocks – which it is unable or 
unwilling to finance (even considering the political and economic costs associated with the 
loss in credibility resulting from government bankruptcy).9 Financing costs also play an 
important role, not only impacting sustainability but also the degree of funds withdrawn 
from the economy in consequence of the debt. In addition to domestic and international 
interest rate levels, the risk of insolvency may also affect financing costs and the crowding 
out effect of the budget on private investment. The ideal level of national debt should 
further enable fiscal policy in reacting flexibly to economic fluctuations without 
compromising its sustainability and the need to confront a major rise in financing costs. If 
sustainability and flexibility is secured, the increase in the amount of national debt may be 
justified in relation to structural reforms – e.g. pension reform – where the costs of transition 
can justifiably be distributed among several generations. With regard to the degree of the 
national debt, the level of productive capital accumulated by the government plays a role, 
as well, for future generations also benefit from the return on productive investments. 
Therefore it is justified that these generations, too, contribute to the costs. 
                                                 
7 By way of interest payable to foreign creditors and the distorting effect of taxes collected on a domestic 
level. 
8 In addition, the expectations of market participants also play a role in shaping the sustainability of national 
debt. In respect of debt denominated in foreign currency, for example, the major devaluation of the exchange 
rate can disable debt financing if such debt is of an excessive amount. Thus, there are instances – analysts 
claim that the case was similar in Brazil in 2001 – in which market expectations are self-fulfilling, i.e. if there is 
confidence in the sustainability of national debt, warranting a stronger exchange rate, the debt will, indeed, be 
sustainable; if confidence is on a low, however, and there is readiness to get rid of invested money even at a 
devalued exchange rate, such devaluation will, in fact, render the debt unsustainable. The rise in the interest 
rate – due to unsustainability concerns – can cause similar problems; this alone may contribute 
unsustainability as a result of higher financing expenses. For the purpose of avoiding similar scenarios, it is 
expedient to keep national debt on a level which does not compromise sustainability in the event of major 
shocks.  
9 The Treasury of the United Kingdom defined sustainability as the level of national debt under which – with 
acceptable premises – current spending and income policies may be sustained indefinitely (HM-Treasury, 
1998, chapter 3.2.4.). It should be emphasized that not only explicit debt is relevant in respect of 
sustainability, but also implicit debt – e.g. related pension or health benefits. 
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International practice has limited information to offer in relation to the ideal level or path 
of national debt in a country. The reason is that there are few countries which explicitly 
determine a long term target path for their national debt. Moreover, some countries of the 
European Union do not judge it necessary to determine independent, long term national 
debt targets due to the clearly defined and transparent requirements of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Nevertheless, some member states of the European Union explicitly 
determine an independent debt target path on the basis of individual aspects. The fiscal 
authority of the United Kingdom, for example, wishes to maintain net national debt at a 
rate of 40 per cent of the GDP, in the average of the economic cycle (its current gross debt 
– the measure used by the Maastricht criteria – amounts to 51 per). Sweden did not define 
a constant target: partly in consequence of implicit national debt arising from aging society, 
fiscal policy wishes to maintain a 2 per cent primary surplus by 2020 (the current gross 
national debt/GDP rate equals 52 per cent, while the net debt rate presently approximates 
0 per cent). Similarly, Denmark wishes to maintain a 1.5-2 per cent general budget surplus 
by the year 2010 (its debt rate is 47 per cent, but similarly to Sweden, it holds liquid assets 
in order to manage problems arising from the aging society). Among new member states, 
Estonia, with a national debt rate of roughly 7 per cent, considers it necessary to maintain a 
balanced budget in the long term, allowing a deficit only in relation to the reform of the 
pension system. The behaviour of these countries suggests the adoption of prudent fiscal policies which, 
independently of the SGP, nevertheless in compliance with it, secure the long term sustainability of fiscal 
policy and the ideal rate of national debt on a national level. 
The determination of the ideal Hungarian debt path comprises a political decision, 
requiring the circumspect consideration of social aspects. Prudent fiscal planning, however, 
is in all cases conditional on securing the sustainability of national debt which may 
contribute to the long term, stable growth of the economy and monetary stability. The 
quantification of the criterion of sustainability is a complex task. Nevertheless, maintaining 
of the 60 per cent gross national debt/GDP proportion at all times, determined by the 
Stability and Growth Pact, could be an important starting point. In 2003, Hungary’s gross 
national debt reached 59.1 per cent of the GDP, in compliance with the sustainability 
criterion of the SGP, but only a narrow margin is left for the government to further 
increase national debt. Sustainability is conditional on the government ensuring the long 
term financing of the subsystems of the budget – such as the pension system and health 
care – and in the event of foreseeable future deficits, it should duly reduce national debt for 
the purpose of creating a room for manoeuvre in the long term. 
Long term demographic trends and the gradual rise of Hungarian income levels 
approximating those in developed countries will foreseeably cause major changes in the 
subsystems of the budget. The study of the OECD, prepared in 2000, comprehensively 
examined the long term sustainability of the subsystems of the budget, and provided 
numerical estimates.10 It concluded that the health care system can pose the largest 
potential risk to fiscal policy in the long term. On the basis of the forecast, presuming an 
unchanged system, the 0.8 per cent deficit of the health care system in proportion to the 
GDP in 2000 would gradually reach 5.7 per cent of the GDP by 2050. The above trend is 
related to the fact that demand for health care products and services will – in line with 
international experience – likely rise at a higher rate than the aggregate income level, as a 
                                                 
10 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] (2000), „OECD Economic Surveys: 
Hungary”, Chapter IV: Coping with ageing. 
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result of the gradual aging of society and the increase in income levels. Thus, the long term 
financing of the deficit of the subsystem might require the reform of the subsystem, or the 
gradual development of a long term room for manouvre. Implementation of the above is 
possible through the gradual reduction of national debt through the provision of budget 
surpluses. The 2004 Convergence Report of the Government also emphasises the long 
term necessity of the structural transformation of the health care system. 
The reform measures of 1997 considerably reduced the anticipated long term deficit of the 
pension system. According to the calculations of Benczúr (1999), the reform produces a 
decrease in (implicit) debt, corresponding to 80 per cent of the GDP, roughly equalling a 
1.5 per cent permanent reduction of the budget deficit. If left unchanged, the pension 
system will likely produce additional deficits in the long term: according to the 
Convergence Report, the 1.4 per cent deficit in 2004 will rise to 2.6 per cent by 2050, 
following an interim, moderate fall. The 1999 study of Benczúr confirms the long term 
deficit in the system; currently the implicit national debt linked to the pension system 
reaches approximately 40 per cent of the GDP. The 2001 analysis of Rocha and Vittas 
reaches a similar conclusion, forecasting a permanent deficit from 2030, corresponding to 
roughly 1 per cent of the GDP. Thus, for the purpose of sustaining national debt, specific 
elements (e.g. retirement age) of the pension system must be modified or the currently high 
rate of national debt reduced, allowing the ongoing financing of the subsystem.   
II. 2. The stabilising function of fiscal policy 
The budget deficit – corresponding to government expenditures financed with loans – may 
offer two advantages: firstly, it may support the stabilisation efforts of the government in 
handling economic fluctuations, secondly, it may promote the predictable and stable trends 
in tax absorption causing distortions in the economy (tax smoothing). Presently, it is agreed 
that by way of a temporary deficit (or surplus), fiscal policy may contribute to the short 
term stabilisation of the economy, but a lasting deficit may lead to the falling rate of output 
and growth.11
Numerous factors impact the efficiency of budgetary stabilisation; the Keynesian and non-
Keynesian theoretical approaches emphasise the importance of different channels. 12 The 
Keynesian approach assumes that consumers plan for the short term, and face liquidity 
constraints; thus, the most important impact is related to the demand-channel, caused by 
changes affecting disposable income. According to this approach, the direct demand effects 
of changes in government expenditures may be intensified by indirect effects on 
consumption through disposable income. This concept follows the category of the cash 
flow deficit (borrowing requirement), for it is irrelevant whether a measure is of a 
temporary nature, or whether it would affect another period under an accrual approach. 
The non-Keynesian approach assumes that consumers have rational expectations and 
adequate liquidity, they plan for the long term and take the impact of budgetary policy on 
supply into consideration, as well. On the basis of this approach, the effect of the fiscal 
measure is fundamentally influenced by the fact whether consumers judge the measure to 
                                                 
11 There is a difference between the short term stabilization of cyclical fluctuations and long term 
stabilization. The latter process corresponds to the moderation of macroeconomic inbalances (e.g. long term 
deficit of the current balance of payments) leading to sustainability concerns. 
 
12 For a detailed review of this issue, see, for example, P. Kiss (2002) or Capet (2004). 
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be of a temporary nature and to establish the mid-term impact of the measure on supply13, 
for in some cases, the fiscal multiplier may become negative. Attempts are made to 
integrate the Keynesian and non-Keynesian approaches to be more in line with empirical 
observations. An attempt, for example, assumes heterogeneous households, for some 
households do, indeed, have limited liquidity and plan for the short term, while other 
rational households have higher liquidity and plan for the long term14. 
The openness of an economy also bears a considerable impact on the stabilising abilities of 
fiscal policy. Depending on the openness of the economy, part of the demand increased by 
fiscal policy is manifested in the demand for imports, therefore it does not contribute to 
the smoothing of domestic output. 
The balance of the budget plays a fundamental role in determining the trend of the rate of 
national debt to the GDP; trends in the deficit (and surplus) significantly impact the 
sustainability of fiscal policy in the long term. The following equation may be established 
for the rate of change of national debt to output ( b ): , where η corresponds 
to the total budget deficit, π is the rate of inflation and q is economic growth.
& bqb )( +−= πη&
15 On the basis 
of the formula, if the government wishes to remain within a defined national debt/output 
rate in the long term, the structural deficit may not exceed the reference level which is 
determined by multiplying the growth of the economy with debt. With a 60% national 
debt/national debt rate (b), 2% inflation (π) and 3% real growth (q), such reference level 
equals 3%, for example. This, however, also means that if the deficit exceeds such 
reference level in the period of an economic slump, thereby moderating the recession, in 
the period of recovery the deficit must again be lower than the above level, which in turn 
reduces the increased rate of national debt. Such behaviour is in accordance with the 
stabilisation role which aims at moderating excessively negative and excessively positive 
fluctuations. It is worth noting that productive government investments do not pose a risk 
to fiscal sustainability if their long term social return is warranted. Since, however, return 
generally remains uncertain, it is not simple to separate productive investments from 
expenditures deemed to be government consumption; such differentiation may also seem 
questionable to market participants financing government expenditures, and might increase 
the risk premium expected on their investments. 
Changes in the specific indicators of the deficit (e.g. primary balance, cyclically adjusted 
deficit, CAB) are considered when deciding whether fiscal policy stabilises the economy or 
is, in fact, producing a procyclical effect. Three fundamental factors may determine changes 
in the deficit: firstly, the function of automatic stabilisers, secondly, the effect of discretional 
government measures, and thirdly, the passive behaviour of the government related to the 
institutional solutions and rules of the budget. The effects of the above three key theoretical 
factors are very difficult to separate and quantify in practice. 
II. 2. 1. Automatic stabilisers 
Fiscal policy may carry out its stabilising function by way of automatic stabilisers or 
discretionary measures. The automatic stabilisers represent rules on expenditures or 
                                                 
13 Such impact on supply is manifested if, for example, the reduction of the wageincrease in the government 
sector (also decreasing government expenditures) leads to a lower wagerise in the private sector, thereby 
improving competitiveness. 
14 See e.g. Mankiw (2000), Gali et. al (2004), Bilbiie-Straub (2004). 
15 See e.g. Buiter and Grafe (2002) for the deduction of the formula and other useful budgetary-arithmetical 
equations. 
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revenues which modify the balance of the budget, in accordance with the cyclical 
fluctuations of the economy. Tax and contribution systems can be considered revenue rules 
which warrant that the revenue side of the budget remain in proportion to economic 
performance and income. Moreover, the rising rate of (progressive) income tax also 
increases the average tax rate without any need for additional decisions, therefore it 
automatically reduces the unreasonable increase in demand, securing budget revenue rise in 
excess of the rise in income. In the event of falling income, on the contrary, the average tax 
rate, and thus the rate of income absorption, is automatically reduced, which in turn 
moderates the fall in demand. While the progressivity enhances the impact of automatic 
stabilisers, the regressive elements of the tax system (ceilings, itemised determination of 
taxes) weaken these. The effect of automatic stabilisers is bolstered by (e.g. unemployment 
related) anticyclic expenditures, and weakened by expenditures moving in the direction of 
the cycle (e.g. indexed for real variables). Automatic stabilisers have the advantage of not 
requiring special decision making – often involving major delays, and they are levelled off 
in the average of the economic cycle, consequently not imposing a risk to sustainability. 
The estimates of automatic stabilisers in various countries made by different institutions 
(EU, ECB, OECD, IMF) vary considerably. When estimating cyclical fluctuations, it is 
necessary to estimate the trends of potential growth or specific real economic variables 
(ECB), and to determine the cyclical flexibility of specific items of the budget. The 
simultaneity between the deficit affected by the cycle and economic growth impacted by 
the deficit comprises a common problem of the standard methods. Furthermore, these 
methods disregard the fact the nominal and real variables may trend in opposite directions 
(e.g. in the event of an inflationary surprise). The estimation of budget flexibility is also 
based on simplifications, for it can filter out the asymmetric and lagged effects of the tax 
and expenditure system only with difficulties.16 There are alternative approaches which do 
not consider the cyclical exposure of the revenue side as a basis, but rather its inverse, the 
stability of the expenditure side. In this case, the difficulty is mostly related to the means of 
determining the neutral fiscal policy serving as a basis of comparison. 17  
The general result of earlier empirical studies pointed to the greater stabilising role of a 
larger budget. This is partly explained by the greater share of the government within the 
GDP (composition effect), and partly by the role of households with liquidity constraints 
(Andrés, Doménech and Fatás, 2004). On the basis of the alternative definition, however, 
empirical analysis can find non-linear effects of stabilisers. According to the results of 
Silgoner and the co-authors (2003), the automatic stabilisers do not reduce cyclical 
fluctuations above a specific level of expenditure as a proportion of GDP. We may call it as 
the diminishing return of smoothing which, according to their estimates, emerge above the 
38 per cent rate of GDP-proportionate expenditure. A simulation has also been carried out 
on the basis of a definition focusing rather on the revenue side, indicating that in relation 
to GDP-proportionate taxes, there are threshold values above which the budget may have 
                                                 
16 Thus, for example, the indexing of expenditure may be retrospective, or the size of negative corporate tax 
(due to losses) is limited to zero tax liability therefore negative taxes are spread over time depending on tax 
liabilities on next years’ profits. The period of unemployment benefit may also be shorter than the term of the 
cycle, therefore the boom does not produce similar savings – there is an asymmetrical effect in relation to 
expenditures. 
17 There are practical approaches, filtering out all fluctuations from the time-series, defining these as 
discretional. This is all the more a simplification, for in this case, the cyclical effects (e.g. unemployment 
expenditures) arising on the expenditure side are also filtered (Silgoner and co-authors, 2003). According to 
other definitions, neutral fiscal policy indicates an unchanged rate in proportion to the GDP, i.e. expenditures 
would follow the actual rate of growth (Von Hagen and co-authors, 2001). 
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a destabilising effect in the event of supply shocks (Buti and van den Noord, 2003). The 
threshold depends on the level of openness; the greater the openness of the economy, the 
smaller the stabilising effect and the greater the destabilising one. 
Based on a Hungarian estimate similar to the method of the ECB, it may be established 
that currently the automatic stabilising effect of the budget is smaller than average (P. Kiss-
Vadas, 2004). This is partly due to the fact that the expenditure side is linked to the cycle at 
a higher than average rate, as a result of the indexing of pensions to real wages. In addition, 
despite the high proportion of tax revenue to the GDP, a major degree of revenue is not 
linked to the cycle such as taxes paid on government wages, taxes on government 
procurements and nominally determined taxes (itemised excise tax, health contribution). 
Since the role of fiscal stabilisers is enhanced after the introduction of the euro, in this 
respect it would be favourable to change the tax and expenditure system (e.g. strengthening 
its progressivity) to heighten the cyclical sensitivity of the budget. 
II. 2. 2. Discretionary measures 
In the event of contingent economic shocks, the fluctuations of the economy can 
justifiably be counteracted by discretionary measures. Their efficiency can be analysed on 
both theoretical and practical grounds. The impact of the measures is fundamentally 
influenced by the aforementioned features of the private sector – e.g. financial constraints 
of consumers and their planning horizon, and the openness of the economy. 
Irrespective of the private sector’s characteristics, institutional factors of the budget reduce 
the effects of the fiscal multiplier. These factors include timing, controllability and 
subsequent evaluation of the discretionary measures. For this reason, it is important that 
adequate functioning of automatic stabilisers reduce the necessity of discretionary 
measures, thereby greatly contributing to the predictability of fiscal policy and limiting the 
risk of mistakes in economic policy. 
Discretionary measures require circumspect preparation, taking into account the expected 
economic impact of the measure, the time requirement of the decision, the degree of 
delayed economic impact (to avoid, for example, that the effect of a measure mitigating 
regression is only felt in the period of recovery, thereby increasing fluctuations) and 
whether the measure may be modified in the future, if necessary. 
Controllability may pose a serious problem because the lower levels of the budget (local 
governments, budgetary units) may have a high degree of independence. In this respect, 
central government can often influence only the framework of operation, and therefore, in 
the course of implementation, deviations may occur from the plan. Subsequent evaluation 
may also cause difficulties, for the accurate filtering of the effect of automatic stabilisers 
would require a clear definition of neutral behaviour in fiscal policy – allowing the 
determination of a discretionary measure. 18 Numerous problems arise – from the 
valorisation of nominal elements in the tax system to the determination of the neutral path 
of specific expenditures. The impact of planning mistakes (over- or underestimation of 
growth, inflation, tax bases) on the deficit is subsequently confused with the effect of 
                                                 
18 According to a possible approach, neutral fiscal policy corresponds to the sustaining of expenditures at an 
unchanged proportion to the GDP. This means that expenditures would be increased at the current rate of 
economic growth and inflation, instead of potential growth and the consistent rate of inflation. In this 
approach, Buti and Van den Noord (2003) define the growth and inflation “dividend” as the difference 
between current and potential rates, and define the remainder value as the so-called “genuine” discretionary 
policy.  
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discretionary measures defined in the traditional sense. The fiscal inertia arising form 
planning and implementation related problems may not only cause delays in relation to 
discretionary measures, but can also cause systematic deviations from the fiscal target. We 
will examine this issue in greater detail in the chapter on fiscal consolidation. 
II. 3. Institutional issues in the EMU: the Stability and Growth Pact 
and quality aspects of the budget 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), setting constraints to the fiscal policies of member 
states, represents one of the fundamental pillars of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union.19 The institutional safeguard of prudent common monetary policy is established by 
the other pillar – the European Central Bank (ECB) – which functions independently of 
other EU institutions and member states, and has the primary objective of price stability. 20 
Contrary to monetary policy, fiscal policies are determined on national levels. This 
institutional structure, however, may prompt governments, planning for the short term, to 
adopt imprudent fiscal policies.21 One reason is that since the common monetary policy 
covers the whole euro zone, the larger budget deficit of a member country may contribute 
to growth in the short term, without facing any substantial monetary contraction. In 
addition, the behaviour of the market indicates that despite provisions prohibiting explicit 
bail outs, they attach a minimal chance of a eurozone member state becoming insolvent 
independently of the others.22 As a direct consequence, imprudent fiscal policy of a 
member country leads to the increase of interest paid on its debt only to a limited extent, 
influencing, nevertheless, the long term level of the interest rate in the euro zone.23 Thus, in 
place of the disciplinary powers of the market and national monetary policies, the Stability 
and Growth Pact is there to support the sustainability of the fiscal policy of member 
countries.  
The Stability and Growth Pact is set up to respect the different political and social needs of 
member states, therefore it does not determine rules regarding the size of the budget or its 
composition. Nevertheless, with a view to sustainable long term fiscal policy, the Pact 
limits the permitted rate of the annual balance and the national debt, and sets out financial 
sanctions in the event of their severe and prolonged infringement. According to the SGP, 
the (cyclically adjusted) structural balance of the annual budget must show a balance or a 
surplus, and the budget deficit for a given year may not exceed 3 per cent of the GDP. The 
gross national debt/GDP proportion is maximised by the Pact at 60 per cent. These 
requirements of the Pact are set out to define a simple, transparent and easily monitored 
system of rules which allows the prudent drafting of national fiscal policies, minimally 
obstructing member countries in adopting an ideal and flexible, independent fiscal policy. 
The ambiguous criteria on long term fiscal sustainability are substituted with a simple rule 
of the Stability and Growth Pact: the proportion of gross national debt to the GDP may 
                                                 
19 See, for example, ECB (1999) for SGP rules and summary of implementation. 
20 If the ECB deems this objective to be secured, it also assumes the responsibility of moderating short term 
economic fluctuations. (ECB (2004), p. 44) 
21 See e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1995) in respect of political-economic considerations leading to imprudent 
fiscal policies. 
22 Bernoth et. al. (2004) established a non-linear relationship between the level of debt and the interest 
premium, concluding that the expected risk premium is reduced upon accession to the euro zone, provided 
the given country did not adopt a severely imprudent budget policy in the past. 
23 See Faini (2004). 
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not exceed the 60 per cent limit. Although the specific level is of an ad hoc nature24, and 
perhaps it would be warranted, theoretically, to consider the net national debt, instead of 
the gross figure25; the rule, nevertheless, sets a clear and easily monitored criterion, and long 
term compliance with this rule does, in fact, secure the sustainability of fiscal policy. Rules 
limiting the annual degree of the budget deficit also promote sustainability. On the premise 
of a 5 per cent long term nominal rise in the GDP26 – considered excessive by today’s 
standards – the maximisation of the budget deficit at 3 per cent, for example, ensures that 
the GDP-proportionate national debt does not exceed the 60 per cent limit in the long 
term. The rule imposing structural balance or surplus, however, sets a more stringent 
requirement which could, in itself, might reduce the level of national debt. It should be 
pointed out, however, that the aging society leads to anticipated future obligations in the 
countries of the European Union, posing a risk to sustaining current levels of national debt. 
According to the calculations of the European Commission – coordinated with member 
states – if the member countries of the euro zone would not comply with the SGP, and 
would not maintain a structural balance, fiscal policy, in most states, would become 
unsustainable. 27
The 3 per cent budget deficit limit wishes to provide flexibility for member states 
implementing stabilisation policies. Although the 3 per cent level is, to a certain extent, of 
an ad hoc nature, as well, on the basis of the past behaviour of EU member states and 
assuming a structurally balanced budget, it would not have posed a real limit28, excluding 
exceptionally high recessions.29 Although the elimination of an independent monetary 
policy may theoretically necessitate greater room for fiscal actions, the problems of 
countries30 currently infringing the 3 per cent limit primarily arise from the fact that they 
were unable to establish a structural balance for the budget prior to the economic 
recession. 
According to the simulations of the OECD, the average figures of OECD countries 
indicate that in the 1990s, discretional measures reduced cyclical fluctuations by half. 
Within the above average, however, countries in the euro zone – in reaction to stringent 
                                                 
24 The selection of the limit could be linked to the fact that in 1992, in the course of defining the Maastricht 
criteria, the average gross national debt/GDP rate in EU countries reached 60.7 per cent. 
25 Net debt also includes government loans. It is warranted to weight the value of such loans according to 
their riskiness, however, which is a complex task and would, in any case, reduce the transparency of the rule. 
In practice, the budget may also subsidize unprofitable companies with loans and transfers whereby such 
amounts are not indicated in the deficit or only at a later time (debt remission). On the other hand, the above 
is immediately reflected in the gross debt, indicating the problem in advance. (Of course, this figure may be 
misleading, as well, if companies receive loans with a government guarantee.) Practically, an indicator is 
required which is composed of the balance of gross debt and market debt (deposits). This indicator, however, 
would presumably not vary significantly from the current figures, for many countries use their financial assets 
to temporarily reduce the amount of debt for the purpose of producing a more favourable debt indicator at 
the end of the year.  
26 The value is produced as the sum of 2 per cent inflation and 3 per cent long term, real growth. According 
to Thygessen (2002), this rate was considered realistic in 1992. 
27 See European Commission (2004). 
28 See e.g. Buti and Sapir (1998). 
29 The SGP offers an exemption from compliance with the criteria in the event of major recessions. The 
exemption is automatic upon a 2 per cent real decrease in economic performance; in relation to a recession 
reaching a rate between 0.75 per cent and 2 per cent, the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers decides 
on granting the exemption, on the basis of the proposal of the Commission. According to the current 
proposal of the Commission, a member state would be granted exemption even in the event of prolonged 
slow growth.  
30 E.g. Germany, France. 
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fiscal policy – experienced the contrary effect; actual fluctuation exceeded by nearly double 
the estimated value which would have realised without fiscal consolidation (Van den 
Noord, 2000). 
One of the recent analyses of the Commission indicates the apparent growth of 
procyclicality (EC, 2004). If, however, their estimate included the debt – as the other 
determinant of discretional fiscal policy – among variables, such growth could not have 
been established. Neither has occurred a fall in procyclicality, however; unfunded tax cuts 
implemented under favourable cyclical conditions, had to be compensated with tightening 
measures under adverse circumstances. Estimating fiscal rules, the econometric analysis of 
Gali and Perotti (2003) concluded that in EMU countries, the budget, on the whole, 
became increasingly anticyclical in the period following the introduction of the euro. 
In the EU, changing fiscal behaviour resulted in a deficit reduction after 1994, 
corresponding to 1 per cent of the GDP on average. Applying the QUEST model, In’t 
Veld and Turrini (EC) examined potential scenarios with a lack of fiscal discipline. 
According to their results, national debt would have significantly increased, and in the most 
optimistic case (without the rise in risk premium), the lack of discipline would have 
increased the GDP by only 0.5 per cent. Moreover, this impact would have quickly 
subsided (In’t Veld and Turrini, 2004). 
The aforementioned analyses, however, have not examined whether the changing observed 
fiscal behaviour was a result of a genuine decrease in the deficit or it was caused by 
temporary and formal measures (creative accounting). Many EU countries made efforts to 
reduce the deficit through the use of loopholes offered by statistical definitions.31 This 
supports the observation of Goodhart which suggests that the indicator applied to measure 
the target becomes distorted. 32  
There is an ongoing debate in the EU on type of modifications required in the SGP to 
improve its efficiency without jeopardizing its goals. 33 According to a communication34 
issued by the European Commission, the requirements of 3 per cent deficit and the 60 per 
cent rate of the national debt are to remain in place; in fact, debt criteria are to be assured 
an enhanced role in the future. According to the proposal, the Commission would 
elaborate explicit recommendations for member states on the ideal level of the structural 
balance, taking into consideration country-specific requirements for securing long term 
sustainability, including the initial rate of debt, expected growth, anticipated costs arising 
from aging and the reasonable level of productive budgetary investments.35 The above 
measure would be of particular importance for transition countries, for these economies 
generally grow at a rate higher than the EU average, possibly warranting larger budgetary 
investments. If such investments are productive and contribute to economic growth, often 
                                                 
31 To avoid this problem, statistical definitions are becoming increasingly specific and fixed. Creative 
accounting has been transformed, but not eliminated. The statisticians of the IMF, for example, have raised 
the issue of rigid definitions in relation to sector borders (IMF, 2003). Putting more emphasis on substantive 
aspects could serve as an alternative. The next chapter will refer to the problem of creative accounting.  
32 On Hungarian experience, see the fiscal chapter in the publication entitled “Manual to Hungarian 
Economic Statistics”.  
33 For a summary, see e.g. Orbán-Szapáry (2004), Buti et. al (2003), Franco – Balassone – Francese (2003), 
Ongena – Winkler (2003). 
34 European Commission (2004). 
35 In this respect, it may react to criticism of SGP, which would entrust the promotion of sustainability to 
“living organizations” and not to “dead rules”. See, for example, Fatás and his co-authors (2003) who would 
support an independent European “Sustainability Council”. 
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unforeseeable in relation to investment decisions, the guarantee of repayment could be 
established in the long term, therefore they do not necessarily pose a risk to the long term 
financing of national debt. Moreover, such investments worsen the structural deficit only 
to a limited degree, for the EU provides financing for these with considerable amounts.36 
But on the whole, the budget of transition countries does not indicate such positive 
balances (with negative balances in some cases) due to payments made to the European 
Union.  
The EU places an emphasis on the quality of budgetary finances in the Lisbon strategy, as 
reflected in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. In the process of assessing 
Convergence Programs, the EU also monitors the quality aspects of fiscal policy. The 2004 
Public Finance Report attempts to specify quality related considerations, focusing on the 
relationship between fiscal policy and long term economic growth as the most important 
issue. With the summary of current empirical data, it determines that the comparison of 
costs (higher taxes) and profit (economy and implementation of social policy targets) is of 
fundamental importance. The results, however, vary with regard to the most important 
issue – separation of productive and non-productive expenditures; different analyses 
determine productive budget expenditures to range from 5 per cent to 44 per cent of total 
expenditures in EU countries. 
Trends in the expenditure structure indicate that the effects of aging are already apparent, 
for the rate of health care and social (pension) expenditures, primarily, have increased in 
the past decade. With a view to promoting quality aspects, it is necessary to improve the 
current distribution and control of funds. For the above purpose, in addition to ensuring 
control over the predefined, mid-term path of expenditures, the application of cost-benefit 
analyses and performance based budgeting is essentially important. 
    
                                                 
36 See e.g. Sapir et. al. (2003) p. 141, Coricelli – Ercolani (2002). 
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III. Fiscal consolidation 
III. 1. Theoretical considerations and international experience 
When reviewing empirical literature on fiscal adjustments and the experience of current 
EMU member countries, we are predominantly searching for factors which affect the 
success of adjustment. The criterion of success is primarily determined by the endurance of 
the improved budget balance, and the growth sacrifice of adjustment is also analysed. 
III. 1. 1. International experience: stylised facts from the empirical literature  
On the basis of extensive empirical literature analysing fiscal adjustments implemented by 
developed countries in the past decades, the success of adjustment is affected by various 
endogenous and exogenous factors whose impact may not be isolated in general. 
A potentially essential characteristic of consolidation, is the reasons and goals of its 
realisation. Some fiscal consolidations were linked to the accession to the EMU, while 
some were motivated by the necessity of macroeconomic stabilisation. The distinction is 
important because fiscal consolidation – corresponding to the improvement of the budget 
balance – does not necessarily imply macroeconomic adjustment. Such stabilisation, 
instead, is caused by those measures of the consolidation which produces a real 
macroeconomic impact, improving, for example, the external balance. The cut in budget 
expenditures implemented by increasing quasi-fiscal expenditures, for example, improves 
only the official deficit figure and that only in the short term, because quasi-fiscal debt may 
not be increased indefinitely – sooner or later it will be reflected in the deficit. 
Main message of empirical analyses: the structure of adjustment is important 
The methods of analysis examining consolidation are not uniform. Nevertheless, the 
general results of the analyses indicate that the structure of consolidation fundamentally 
impacts success. 
 
Most of the analyses prepared on this topic conclude that fiscal adjustments on the 
expenditure side proved to be lasting, whereas adjustments implemented through the raise 
in taxes did not produce enduring consolidation.37 The durability of adjustment is also 
influenced by the specific types of expenditure reduced during the tightening. Several 
analyses have pointed out that the probability of success is increased if the cut in 
expenditures affects the size of the workforce and wages in the public sector or influences 
other welfare and social expenditures. On contrary, this probability is reduced however, if, 
for example,  the direct investment expenditures of the budget are reduced, which could 
improve the productivity of the economy. The durability of adjustment is particularly 
reinforced if the public sector wage cuts are supported by comprehensive wage agreements 
in the private sector.38
These studies generally explain the endurance of expenditure reducing consolidations with 
the fact that in this case the growth sacrifice of adjustments was, on average, smaller. 
Moreover, in some cases the GDP increased during the adjustment or in the subsequent 
                                                 
37 See e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1995,1996), Perotti (1996), von Hagen(2001), Alesina and Ardagna (1998). 
38 Alesina and Ardagna (1998). 
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year, i.e. the adjustment was not restrictive.39 (See Box 1.) Despite the robustness of this 
finding, this result is only acceptable with reservation, for there are factors which were 
disregarded by most of these studies.  
? Logically, the analyses applied official expenditure and revenue data, therefore they 
were unable to consider quasi-fiscal expenditures, although the cut in expenditures 
frequently simply covers the removal of expenditures from the budget. Since in this 
case, the impact of the budget on demand is not reduced, it is not surprising that no 
growth sacrifice is involved. Thus, the analysis of quality aspects is disregarded, similarly 
to the institutional solutions of the budget (e.g. fiscal rules), which may substantially 
influence the long term endurance of consolidations. 
? The analyses did not examine the persistent characteristics of the initial situation. 
Instead, they compared figures to the data of the year preceding adjustment, 
irrespective whether these were in line with trends and or rather related to temporary 
factors. In the event of a tax increase, for example, the results are not equivalent if the 
measure raises the long term trend itself, or just restores conditions corresponding to 
the previous trend, following a temporary downturn. 
? Most of the studies examined the wider macroeconomic context only to a limited degree. 
They did not analyse, for example, whether the fall in GDP-proportionate expenditure 
is the result of a nominal cut in expenditures or just the lack of inflation compensation 
(possibly deliberate inflation). An inflationary shock following a major nominal 
devaluation, for example, results in a considerable fall in GDP-proportionate 
expenditures through the inflation of nominally determined expenditures. In this case, 
the growth sacrifice may be counterbalanced by the temporary improvement in 
competitiveness resulting from inflation. 
   
Box 1: non-Keynesian impacts of fiscal consolidation  
Since the 1980s, the so-called non-Keynesian effects of the budget are popular topics in 
theoretical and empirical literature, offering theoretical explanations as to why the growth 
sacrifice of adjustment remains moderate under certain circumstances, potentially even 
inducing a positive impact on growth. 
The expansionary – non-Keynesian – effect of tightening measures may arise from several 
sources – from both the demand and supply sides. Expectations play a prominent role on 
the demand side. In the event of a genuine tightening measure, the expectated level of 
future tax burdens might reduce, resulting in an expected rise in future disposable income 
of the households. This might lead to the rise in current consumption. In addition, a 
tightening measure which is judged to be of a lasting nature may reduce the risk premium, 
and thereby decrease the long term interest rates, inducing higher investments. According 
to empirical analyses, expenditure cutting measures (with a focus on wages and public 
benefits) produced a more favourable impact on expectations, since cuts affecting 
politically sensitive areas reflect intentions for genuine adjustment. Thereby, the wealth-
effect and the impact on credibility is stronger if the tightening influences the expenditure 
side. 40 The positive effect on growth may originate from the supply side41; the cut in 
                                                 
39 See e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), EC (2003), Giudice et.al. (2003), 
Giavazzi et.al. (1999), Perotti (1997), Alesina and Perotti (1997). 
40 See e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), McDermott and Wescott, Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Giudice et.al. 
(2003), Alesina and Perotti (1996). 
41 E.g. Alesina and co-authors (2002). 
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expenditures – particularly if it involves a reduction in public wage-rise, in parallel with an 
extensive wage agreement – causes a fall in the unit labour cost. The rise in labour taxes, 
however, may result in the growth of real wages and a drop in labour demand, particularly 
on a well organised labour market. 
The practical relevance of expansionary fiscal contractions should be interpreted with care, 
despite its considerable literature. Reviewing the literature of on the topic, Prammer (2004) 
concludes that there is no clear empirical evidence on the existence and origin of non-
Keynesian effects. The author points to the fact that the reduction of the deficit was in 
many cases was part of a comprehensive economic policy package, thus the growth effect 
of the tightening measure may not be separated from other elements of the package (e.g. 
changes in the exchange rate system, foreign exchange liberalisation, etc.). The absence of 
growth sacrifices, or expansions following consolidation, are in many cases not related to 
the stringency measure itself, but to the other elements of the package. When analysing the 
long term effects of fiscal expenditures on growth, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) conclude 
that expansionary effects may, indeed, be found with respect to specific elements of the 




Initial structure and size of budget  
Studies finding the success of the expenditure-based adjustments do not obviously claim 
that the cut in expenditures in itself guarantees the success of adjustment, nor that only 
expenditure reducing adjustments can be enduring, nor that such adjustments always 
induce smaller growth sacrifices. It is clear that the optimal structure of adjustment may not 
be isolated from either the initial structure of the expenditure and the revenue side, or the 
size of the budget. Both the 1980s (e.g. Denmark) and the 1990s (e.g. Belgium, see in 
sections below) provide examples on the success of revenue-increasing adjustments. In 
these cases, the high deficit was primarily caused by the inefficient and distorting tax 
system and the high rate of tax evasion. Thus, a comprehensive tax reform, increasing, for 
example, the tax base, resulted in higher revenue – even upon falling marginal tax rates. 
Changes affecting the rate of income redistribution are also important aspects of fiscal 
consolidation. Although the optimal size of the public sector is affected by numerous 
structural factors (e.g. openness, per capita income, etc.), there is increasing consensus that 
the rise in the rate of income redistribution in developed countries from the 1960s to the 
1980s was excessive adversely effecting economic efficiency. Several analyses have pointed 
out that the increasing level of subsidies and transfers generally do not achieve their goals, 
while the distorting taxes required for funding the expenditures result in the loss of 
efficiency.42 In other words, if the redistribution rate is high, an improvement in welfare 
may be achieved through the parallel reduction of revenues and expenditures. For this 
reason, revenue-increasing adjustment strategies also involving increased level in 
redistribution, may be less favourable for the long term growth.43  
In practice, however, the redistribution rates of individual countries allow only a very 
limited comparison due to the specific characteristics of the tax and benefit systems. 
                                                 
42 See e.g. OECD (1995), Zandavakili (1994); Tanzi and Schuknet (1998). 
43 See e.g. Tanzi and Schuknet (1998), Tanzi(1995). 
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Countries, for example, which provide benefits partly through the tax system, e.g. by way 
of tax benefits, apparently produce lower revenue and expenditure rates. 
Initial debt, deficit 
For achieving success, the rate of the initial budgetary imbalance may not be disregarded. 
Results typically indicate that countries where the initial debt/GDP ratio (or its rate of 
growth characterising years preceding the adjustment) was higher, the rate of success is 
higher, with a more pronounced impact of non-Keynesian effects (e.g. von Hagen et.al. 
2001, 2004 and Perotti 1999). This result is presumably related to the fact that in the event 
of a shift from an adverse position and an unsustainable fiscal path, the fall in risk premium 
is higher and the impact of expectations on consumption may be greater, as well. 
 
Quality aspects and budgetary institutions 
Size, speed 
The size and speed of adjustment are frequently analysed characteristics influencing the 
success of consolidation, perhaps because that these are easier to measure than other 
quality and institutional characteristics which, though, may, on occasion, seem more 
important. The results, however, are not concurrent regarding these factors, possibly 
indicating that their impact on the success of adjustment is uncertain. 
According to the results of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), and Giavazzi et.al. (2000), larger 
adjustments have a higher probability of success resulting from the non-Keynesian effects: 
a larger adjustment produces a stronger impact on expectations, thus, there is a greater 
likelihood of a resulting rise in consumption. Von Hagen et.al. (2001) also concluded that 
the longer a tightening measure is delayed, the higher the probability of the reversal or 
failure of the stabilisation process. Faster and greater tightening measures more frequently 
produce a long term effect. It should be noted that in the aforementioned empirical 
analyses, the budgetary adjustments were analised in periods in which the balance fell by at 
least 1-2 per cent of the GDP. Slower consolidations, applying a more gradual approach, 
were not included in the samples, therefore the characteristics of these are less known. 
The majority of the studies (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Alesina and Perotti, 1996), 
however, did not establish major differences between the size of the tighteing measures 
implemented in the course of successful and unsuccessful stabilisations, and concluded that 
the size of adjustment is a less important factor than its structure. 
 
Actual size, quality 
As noted above, the success of adjustments cutting expenditures may be related to more 
commonplace reasons; the fall in expenditures may cover the “outsourcing” of certain 
expenditures from the budget. Thus, in this case, the drop in budget expenditures merely 
conceals the rise in quasi-fiscal amounts which are not indicated in the budget statistics, but 
which influence demand. 
Public private partnerships (PPP), for example, may serve this purpose – fixed investments 
and operation financed by the participation of private capital. In respect of Spain, for 
example, Torres and Pina (2001) observed that roughly 30 per cent of services provided by 
regional governments were outsourced into PPPs. This process, reducing the official deficit 
on a temporary basis, commenced when the central government limited subsidies to local 
governments in the course of fiscal consolidation. 
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Budgetary institutions 
We maintain the view that a key factor impacting the success of the tightening measure is 
whether institutional solutions ensuring endurance (e.g. rules regulating the growth of 
expenditures) are introduced. The role of budgetary institutions and rules determining the 
drafting and implementation of the budget have received little emphasis in literature on 
empirical adjustment. According to analyses, these rules played a key role in several 
countries in keeping the reduced deficit at low levels.44  
The prediction of the macroeconomic path is a common problem arising in the planning 
process of the budget. Rates of inflation, growth, etc., significantly diverging from planned 
figures, may considerably modify the fiscal outcome. According to the latest analyses, in 
recent years, the prediction errors not only increased in the countries of the euro zone45, 
but the predictions were also biased; the planned macroeconomic path resulted in a 
consistently more favourable balance than revealed by actual trends.46 According to the 
analysis of Jonung and Larch (2004), the best method for resolving the problem could be 
the establishment of an institution, independent of the ministry, to forecast the most 
important macroeconomic variables. 
Following the planning and prediction phase, the approval phase of the bill follows in 
which the budget may explicitly or implicitly become loosened relative to the original 
target. In Italy, for example, a rule was introduced in 1990 which stipulates that 
parliamentary proposals may not modify the deficit, thus, funds must be provided to cover 
extra expenditures. In practice, this frequently lead to the acceptance of optimistic 
assumptions (Milesi-Ferretti, 1996). According to empirical results, fiscal performance is 
significantly affected if the macroeconomic program is determined with mandatory effect 
prior to the debate on the budget (Alesina et.al., 1995). 
Additional deviations may occur in the implementation phase from to the approved fiscal 
target. This may occur in countries where amounts carried forward may be flexibly 
transferred between years (e.g. in Italy), where trends of some expenditures may change 
flexibly (open ended) or local governments enjoy major independence. In less flexible 
countries, however, differences may arise if the revenue side – e.g. due to the 
aforementioned prediction related problems – nominally deviates from the plan, while the 
expenditure side remains fixed.47 According to some empirical analyses, such behaviour can 
be judged as passive: the prediction errors and the rigidity of implementation are jointly 
responsible for the marked difference between the forecasted deficit and actual figures in 
the four large EU countries. (Larch and Salto, 2003) 
The evaluation and transparency of the budget are also important factors – not only in 
relation to follow up, but also regarding constraints introduced in the process of drafting 
the budget. The detailed indication of particular activities settled off the budget, for 
example, or the guarantees provided for in the budget items, are important factors of 
transparency (Milesi-Ferretti, 1996). The relevance of the problem is underlined by the 
subsequent data revisions of specific countries (e.g. Portugal, Greece). Although some 
problematic items (e.g. transfers among cash flow and accrual figures, or the mixing of 
                                                 
44 E.g. Alesina-Perotti (1996b). 
45 ECB monthly bulletin, September 2004, box 9., EC, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, October 2004. 
46 Joning and Larch(2004). 
47 For example, the rise in the deficit due to overly optimistic revenue plans may not be counterbalanced with 
the immediate curbing of expenditures. 
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above the line deficit figures with below the line financing items) have been excluded from 
the official deficit figures, they were immediately included in the gross national debt. Other 
items (unprofitable state companies, government guarantees, government liabilities 
resulting from investments financed by companies in a PPP solution), however, are not 
indicated immediately in either the deficit or the gross national debt, only with major delay. 
 
Macroeconomic circumstances 
The complex interaction among the various elements of macroeconomic processes and 
economic policy (fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies) greatly limits the independent 
analysis of fiscal consolidations. Therefore, in the course of analysing the impact of 
adjustments, it is essential to examine exogenous factors which are not influenced by the 
budget, but may, nevertheless, affect the success of adjustment (e.g. monetary policy, 
external economic circumstances, oil prices). According to the results of Von Hagen et.al. 
(2001 and 2004), the success of adjustment was not affected by the tightness of monetary 
policy during the adjustment, measured by the real interest rate. In the sample analysed by 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), the degree of exchange rate devaluation was similar in both 
the successful and the unsuccessful adjustments, therefore it seems that the exchange rate, 
in itself, is not an explanatory factor. Nevertheless, authors of several case studies point out 
that in most of the major expansionary and successful tightening measures, fiscal 
adjustment was preceded or accompanied by significant devaluation/depreciation, greatly 
contributing to the favourable growth effect. 48
Von Hagen et.al. (2001 and 2004) argue that favourable external economic circumstances increase 
the likelihood of the success of adjustment. Many studies, however, did not take into 
account the cyclical position of trade partners, albeit favourable external demand may 
contribute to the improvement of the budget.49 It should be noted that if the cyclical 
position is not adequately considered in the estimate of structural deficit related data, the 
obtained “structural” data may reflect cyclical impacts. Therefore, it is possible that these 
indicate consolidation in cases where only automatic stabilisers were functioning. 
 
III. 1. 2. Experience of current EMU member countries  
The pre-accession experience of EMU countries is particularly important for Hungary. In 
the early 90s many current member states faced major fiscal imbalance – in the year of the 
Maastricht Treaty, 1991, the budget deficit reached an average of 5 per cent in the EMU12. 
Thus, substantial efforts were required in most of the member states to implement fiscal 
convergence stipulated by the treaty. Fiscal consolidation and convergence commenced 
with the Maastricht Treaty, and from 1993, the budget balance improved in all member 
countries of the EMU. The adjustments, however, were not even accross the cases; in 
several countries, the reduction of the deficit was mostly implemented in the 1-2 years 
directly preceding the reference period. Although in most cases, the improvement in the 
interest balance contributed to consolidation – on the whole, the improvement in the 
primary balance was more modest than the fall in the total deficit – the improvement in the 
primary balance approximated 2-3 per cent in several countries in the final two years. 
                                                 
48 E.g. Giavazzi and Pagano(1990). 
49 E.g. von Hagen et.al. (2001). 
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Experiences of the period succeeding the introduction of the euro are contradictory: 
following the establishment of the EMU, several countries witnessed a rise in the deficit or 
a unvariable rate at around 3 per cent (Portugal, Italy, Germany, France). Thus, the period 
which elapsed since the introduction of the euro indicates that although all countries (with 
the exception of Greece) fulfilled the deficit criteria of Maastricht, fiscal consolidation did 
not remain lasting in all member states. By studying adjustments, we not only examine the 
method and degree of the reduction of the deficit to the desired level, but also – examining 
the experience in the years following the introduction of the euro – the factors determining 
the long term success of such adjustments, and whether the flexibility of the budget was 
established / maintained. 
We present below the general conclusions drawn from the experience of EMU countries 
relating to their fiscal adjustment. The Annex, attached to the study, discusses in more 
detail some successful and failed consolidation attempts in the form of case studies, 
focusing on countries which required major tightening measures in the final years to fulfil 
the convergence criteria – where there was a major deficit just a few years prior to the 
introduction of the euro. 
 
General cha acteristics of fiscal consolidations in EMU member states  r
The consolidation periods preceding the introduction of the euro show a heterogeneous 
picture with respect to both the initial situation of the countries (initial debt and size of 
budget) and the method of adjustment (timing, structure). Regarding the average figure in 
the euro zone, fiscal consolidation in the full period extending from 1990 to 1997 can, on 
the whole, be defined as revenue-increasing: in 1997 the GDP-proportionate rate of 
primary expenditures was on a level similar to the figure in 1990. In the breakdown of the 
period, however, we may establish that while expenditures and revenues increased roughly 
in parallel in 1991-1993, from 1994 to 1997 – towards the completion of EMU 
convergence – primary expenditures fell by approximately 1.5 per cent of the GDP, with 
revenues remaining at approximately similar levels. Thus, by the 1997 reference period, the 
average deficit fell to 2.6 per cent, below the 3 per cent criterion (see Chart 1). 
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Chart 1: Budget revenues and expenditures – EMU average 

















Source: European Commission, Ameco 
 
The analysis of Briotti (2004) – focusing on the study of fiscal consolidation in EMU 
member states from 1991 to 2002 – concludes that the structure and the size of fiscal 
consolidation, and the initial situation also influenced the effectiveness of the adjustment 
program. Briotti argues that the experiences of EMU countries mostly support the 
conclusions drawn by empirical literature discussed in the first chapter. Generally, in the 
years following the introduction of the euro, stabilisation failed and the fiscal position 
worsened predominantly in countries which applied adjustment strategies based on tax 
increases and temporary measures (Italy, France, Portugal). Contrary to this, countries in 
which the improvement of the balance was mostly linked to expenditure cuts (e.g. Spain, 
Finland, Ireland and non-EMU countries, such as Sweden and Great Britain), the budgets 
have remained balanced since 1998. The rate of redistribution has fallen considerably in 
these countries; savings accomplished through the long term transformation of the social 
systems frequently enabled the moderation of the revenue side as well.50 In these cases – 
particularly in Finland and Sweden, for example – the long term endurance of adjustment 
was supported by the fact that in addition to the expenditure cuts, institutional frameworks 
were set up in order to regulate the process of planning and/or implementing the budget, 
thereby strengthening budgetary prudence (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). 
It should be emphasised, however, that there are countries in which revenues increased in a 
sustainable manner. In such cases, in the initial situation, the rate of tax revenue was either 
too low (e.g. Greece) and/or the source of growth was primarily related to the structural 
transformation of the tax system. In Belgium, for example, the significant reduction of the 
deficit was primarily implemented through the rise in revenues, and the budget remained 
balanced in the period following the introduction of the euro. 
                                                 
50 It is important to note that the redistribution and centralization rates of individual countries may be 
compared only to a limited degree, due to the characteristics of national tax systems (e.g. tax benefits, etc.). 
Deficit
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According to the other claim of Briotti (2004), countries with a higher initial national debt 
maintained, on the whole, a much larger primary surplus in the period extending from 1992 
to 1997, and the improvement in the primary balance was also greater. This is not 
surprising, in fact, for these countries had to make much greater efforts in fulfilling the 
deficit criteria due to the high rate of interest expenditures (see table). In partial 
disagreement with the results of von Hagen et.al. (2001), we maintain the view that the 
initial amount of debt does not provide a clear prediction for the period succeeding the 
introduction of the euro. The fiscal position of some of the countries with high debt (e.g. 
Italy) almost immediately worsened after 1997, whereas the stabilisation efforts of Belgium 
and Ireland, for example, seem to be successful in the long term. Thus, not only the 
amount of debt and the degree of the initial structural deficit have explanatory power, but 
also whether these countries reacted to their greater adjustment requirements through 
temporary measures or the more extensive restructuring of revenues and expenditures. 
Regarding the success of adjustments, the question arises as to the impact of stringency 
measures on automatic stabilisers and on the flexibility of the budget. Theoretically, the fall 
in the rate of redistribution, the reduction in unemployment benefits and the increase in 
indirect taxes to the disadvantage of income taxes and contributions – changes generally 
supporting successful adjustments – may reduce the automatic stabilising strength of the 
budget, leading to the procyclicality of fiscal policy. Empirical literature analysing the 
experience of member states in the euro zone, however, does not support this hypothesis 
(see chapter II.3). 
Obviously, few analyses have been carried out so far on the growth related impact of the 
adjustments of EMU countries, and the results are far from conclusive. Studies examining 
the issue (e.g. von Hagen et.al. (2001 and 2004)) suggest that a smaller growth was 
sacrificed during the European stabilisation measures in the 90s than was the case in the 
80s. Moreover, the impact of budgetary policy changes on growth was insignificant which, 
according to the authors, indicates the presence of non-Keynesian effects. According to the 
analysts, the absence of growth sacrifice is certainly related to the fact that on the road 
leading to the euro, economic players – confident in the restrictive force of the Maastricht 
Treaty – judged these stringency measures to be of a long term nature, therefore 
expectations produced a more favourable effect on demand. The institutional frameworks 
– discussed above – regulating the drafting to the budget presumably contributed to this 
process. We are of the opinion that in addition to the favourable impact of positive 
expectations on domestic demand, other factors are also responsible for the moderate 
contraction effect.  
Firstly, in most of the EMU countries, the improvement in the interest balance resulting 
from interest convergence greatly contributed to the improvement in the budget balance, 
primarily in the years 1996-1997. This impact was particularly strong in countries with high 
debt rates -  Portugal, Italy, Belgium and Greece – in which the improvement in the 
interest balance reached 2-3 per cent of the GDP in the last two years, and further 
improved in 1998-2002. The marked supporting effect of monetary conditions, however, is 
somewhat contradictory regarding the quality of fiscal adjustment: the reduction caused by 
the interest balance possibly contributed to the fact that these countries were less 
motivated to reduce primary expenditures further. 
Secondly, the rapid fall in the deficit is related in several countries to one-off measures and 
“creative accounting” solutions, which – through the application of accounting tricks – 
contributed to the reduction of the deficit by even 0.5-1 per cent of the GDP, without a 
 27
real improvement in the fiscal position.51 One of the typical solutions involves the formal 
concealment of off-budget expenditures related to state companies, or the manipulation of 
interest expenditures by the modification of the maturity and interest payment structure of 
national debt.52 The one-off measures were accomplished to reduce the costs of the 
consolidation, but the disregard of long term consolidation strategy posed risks to the 
sustainability of the budget. It is underlined by the fact that some of the countries applying 
creative accounting – e.g. Italy, France, Germany, Greece – continued to confront fiscal 
problems following the introduction of the euro, although this is less true of Belgium 
which also achieved major savings through creative accounting. 
Finally, we should make note of transfers originating from the EU which undoubtedly 
represented a major source of revenue, primarily in less developed EU countries.53 The 
impact of revenue originating from structural and cohesion funds on the overall fiscal 
position was not necessarily positive as a result of co-financing and other regulations. 
Moreover, regarding the direct impact, it could, on the whole, even worsen the budget 
balance. The reason is that access to transfers originating from structural funds is partly 
conditional on the real value of domestic investment expenditures of a given country 
reaching the reference value, which, in turn, is jointly determined by the member state and 
the Commission, on the basis of the expenditures of previous years (principle of 
additionality). 
 
III. 1. 3. Experience of emerging and transition countries  
Compared to developed countries, much fewer studies have been carried out on the 
experience of the adjustments of transition countries. Purfield (2003) analysed the 
consolidation of 25 transition countries from 1992 to 2000. The author primarily attempted 
to determine whether factors judged to be of significance in the literature summarising the 
experience of developed countries, e.g. rate and composition of adjustment, are of 
relevance in transition countries, as well. 
                                                 
51 See e.g. Milesi-Ferretti (1999); Dafflon and Rossi (1999). 
52 In France, for example, the 1997 GDP-proportionate budget improved by 0.5 per cent through the one-off 
payment of the state owned France Telecom to the budget, accomplished by the company in exchange for 
the assumption of future pension obligations. With the approval of Eurostat, Greece recorded subsidies 
provided to specific state-owned companies as an increase in their capital which thereby did not influence the 
annual deficit. Greece accomplished major savings on interest expenditures through the issue of zero 
coupons – non-interest-bearing government bonds. The above two accounting measures reduced the deficit 
by a total of 1 per cent of the GDP. Italy earned savings equalling 0.2 per cent of the GDP by retroactively 
recording pensions in arrears – actually burdening the 1997-2000 budget – awarded in court, to 1993-1995, 
the period in which the obligation arose. Additional savings amounting to roughly 0.5 per cent of the GDP 
were produced by the reclassification of the debts of the state rail company and the restructuring of interest 
on postal savings coupons. At the end of 1997, Belgium placed government bonds to state companies for 
three days, achieving a cut in the deficit in excess of 1 per cent of the GDP. In Germany, due to the 
disagreement of the central bank and adverse public opinion, the upward valuation of central bank reserves 
and the payment of the margin to the budget produced a profit only in 1998, following the reference year. 
Other accounting tricks, however, were implemented – e.g. cancellation of the debt of the state privatization 
company from the budget – and these reduced the 1997 budget deficit by a total of approximately 0.7 per 
cent of the GDP (Milesi-Ferretti, 1999; Dafflon-Rossi, 1999). 
53 Between 1994 and 1999, the so-called cohesion countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland) received 
transfers from the structural funds, corresponding to 1.5-3.7 per cent of their GDP. 
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By adopting the method of Alesina and Perotti (1995), Purfield produced partly similar 
results: according to his econometric analysis, the size and composition of adjustment 
proved to influence the success of adjustment significantly. Similarly to the experience of 
industrialised countries, stabilisation measures of transition countries which cut 
expenditures were more likely to be successful than strategies aiming for higher revenues. 
Contrary to the results of Alesina and Perotti (1995), however, adjustments of a larger scale 
were clearly more successful than smaller measures which may suggest that the initial 
imbalance in these countries was greater than in industrialised countries. The authors did 
not find any expansionary effects, although the adjustments did not cause major growth 
sacrifices, either. This may be explained by the fact that under genuine adjustments, yields 
fell to a considerable degree, favourably affecting interest expenditures and the opportunity 
cost of investment expenditures. 
Baldacci et.al. (2004) analysed the consolidation experience of 25 emerging countries 
between 1980 and 2001. First, they established that success was primarily determined by 
the cut in expenditures, but this, in itself, was insufficient for the mid-term sustainability of 
the fiscal position – a rise in revenue was also required. Second, they concluded that 
consolidations concentrating on the second half of the adjustment periods (back-loaded) 
were more successful than those concentrating on the beginning of the period (front-
loaded). This was explained by the fact that social costs were better distributed in the first 
case. Interestingly, the analysis chose less stringent definitions when selecting 
consolidations. The consolidation period was defined to be a year in which the GDP-
proportionate primary balance improved by at least 0.5 per cent. In order to examine 
robustness, their estimations were repeated with the 1 and 1.5 per cent threshold values. 
The main results did not change, but the role of various other variables in the success have 




 III. 2. Fiscal consolidation in Hungary  
Under the Stability and Growth Pact, Hungarian general government will have to achieve a 
close-to-balance or in-surplus position within a set period of time. Practice, however, 
suggests that when stability and convergence programmes are officially evaluated, as 
regards general government finances, quality aspects are also taken into account. Such 
aspects include the sustainability of fiscal consolidation, which is only feasible through 
structural reforms enhancing long-term growth through infrastructural fixed investment 
and tax cuts.  
The reason why the evaluation of quality aspects is crucial is that financial consolidation, 
which is synonymous with improving general government position, does not necessarily 
mean macro-economic adjustment. Only such part of consolidation leads to stabilisation 
that exerts an actual impact on macro-economy, e.g. one that improves external balance. In 
order that such an actual impact can be measured, the MNB has adopted an economic and 
analytical indicator that is called the augmented (SNA) deficit (see Manual to Hungarian 
Economic Statistics). 
Thus, Hungary has an obligation to implement fiscal consolidation. On the other hand 
macro-economic stabilisation is necessary in the economic sense. As we can see no reason 
for assuming that the corporate or the household sector will be able to improve their 
savings position to an extent that leads significant improvement in the external balance, a 
major part of stabilisation will have to come from fiscal consolidation. Based on the results 
of our model simulations, fiscal consolidation, conducive to stabilisation through 
contraction of demand, is likely to exert a minor impact on prices; however, it may be able 
to improve the balance of payments to an extent that represents half of the extent of 
consolidation already in the first year. In the short run, it also puts a brake on economic 
growth to an extent that may amount to approximately one-third of consolidation in the 
first year.54
In what follows, we focus on the next four years in the process of fiscal consolidation, 
examining the room for manoeuvre for fiscal policy. Without estimating an alternative 
interest rate and macroeconomic path, following the principle of an unchanged fiscal 
policy, i.e. focussing on fiscal determinants, our path serves as a relative basis for 
comparison to establish the extent of fiscal measures to be taken in the interest of 
consolidation. By way of introduction, adopting our analytical approach, we discuss an 
initial fiscal situation as we assess it; we then go on to provide a projection for envisaged 
determinants in the coming period as well as possible developments in factors outside the 
control of fiscal policy, e.g. interest rates and fiscal effects of EU membership. In addition 
to presenting a favourable scenario, we point out the risks that we perceive as such. For 
                                                 
54 For a detailed discussion of the topic, see the Current Topics section in the November 2001 and February 
2003 issues of the Report on Inflation. A simulation performed with the NiGEM model examined the effects of 
fiscal expansion in 2001 and 2002, which had a composite structure, i.e. it materialised mainly through an 
increase in fixed investment, wage and transfer expenditure. The simulation arrived at the conclusion that 
most of the short-term impact was exerted on GDP already in the year in question; 1% GDP-proportionate 
increase in expenditure translated into approximately 0.3% increase in GDP. Since Hungary is a small open 
economy, the largest portion of the impact materialised as deterioration in the balance of payments. 
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purposes of illustration, we outline a possible version of fiscal consolidation, which could 
be implemented through restraining expenditure mechanically.  
We accept as an initial assumption that consolidation will materialise, which is reflected in 
our estimate for a decrease in interest expenses.  No consistent alternative macro-economic 
or fiscal paths have been prepared in which no consolidation materialises. No further actual 
assumptions have been made as to the details, structure or quality of assumed 
consolidation or macro-economic stabilisation, which represents a further impediment to 
the preparation of consistent macro-economic paths. The aim of our analysis is to present 
trends and magnitude; what would go beyond this is raising the issue of detailed measures 
aimed at consolidation. It should, however, be pointed out that measures based on quality 
aspects and taken in order to create sustainable consolidation are key to the 
implementation of macro-economic adjustment. 
III. 2. 1. The initial situation 
The current situation can be characterised on the basis of our estimate for the structure of 
GDP-proportionate revenue and expenditure, deficit, debts, quasi-fiscal liabilities and the 
institutional framework of the budget.  
As the official deficit reflects more lasting trends only in part, we follow our standard 
methodology.55 The ‘augmented SNA deficit’ under the economic and analytical 
methodology incorporates the impact of quasi-fiscal items, but it excludes purely 
‘accounting’ items such as a subsequent repayment of quasi-fiscal debts or temporary 
impacts like the discretionary scheduling of VAT refunds. Our own analytical methodology 
was adopted to study both deficit and trends in revenue and expenditure. 
Structure of revenue and expenditure  
A review of the trends in revenue and expenditure between 1990 and 2003 reveals that 
increasing revenues, though an attempt at doing so only characterised the initial part of this 
was not successful.56 Expenditure and, within it, primary expenditure did not move in 
conjunction with declining GDP (thus, there was a GDP-proportionate increase in it). 
Then, in 1995, at the time of surprise inflation, both its real and GDP-proportionate values 
were corrected. From 1995 to 2001, primary expenditure remained stable, and then it 
exceeded GDP growth. 
In order for a more detailed analysis to be performed, further breakdown is needed. One 
possible method of classifying expenditure items differentiates between interest expenses, 
corporate current subsidies, other current expenses (e.g. operational expenses and 
household transfers) and capital expenditure.57 Past trends in expenditure reveal that, 
                                                 
55 For details, see Manual to Hungarian Economic Statistics 
(http://www.mnb.hu/dokumentumok/kezikonyv_magyar_gazd_hu.pdf). The updating and a more detailed 
treatment of fiscal methodology are currently underway.  
56 Revenue and expenditure as a proportion of GDP are high in an international comparison; however, for 
actual comparison to be made, various types of adjustment ought to be performed. For instance, general 
government items ought to be fully consolidated, i.e. both revenue and expenditure ought to be calculated 
less of VAT and contributions paid by general government institutions. On the other hand, however, tax 
expenditures on the revenue side ought to be recognised as expenditure. As the importance of these items 
vary from one country to the next, comparison remains biased. 
57 Economically, there is no sharp demarcation between the individual expenditure items, since certain 
services (provided by corporations in e.g. transport) are similar, as is the case with general government 
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compared to other categories, operational expenses and household transfers are more rigid 
downward in nominal terms. The reason why they diminished significantly as a proportion 
of GDP during the adjustment in 1995 and 1996 was that surprise inflation reduced 
nominally fixed expenditure both in real terms and as a proportion of GDP. 
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Table 1 Structure of expenditure adjusted by temporary and quasi-fiscal items  
1998-2003 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
 






                                                                                                                                               
operational expenses. As these expenses are covered by current subsidies only in part, a certain part of them 
are recorded in capital expenditure that settles losses subsequently. 
Total expenditure Primary  expenditure Operational exp. and transfer to households 
2001 2002 1998 1999 2000 2003
Expenditure total 52.8 51.1 48.6 49.8 53.7 50.9
Interest and losses of the Central Bank 4.5 9.3 7.6 6.1 5.2 4.2
7.0 Investment and housing 5.0 4.9 5.2 6.0 5.1
5.9 Current and capital transfer to corporate sector 4.6 4.1 4.1 3.9 4.9
Operational exp. and transfer to households 36.3 33.9 34.5 33.2 34.7 36.7
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Of more determined current expenditures (i.e. those that can be the least reduced), 
operational expenditures, following the wage increase in the public sector from 2002 
onwards, stabilised at a higher level in 2002 and 2003; so did household transfers that 
followed a similar path. Not even reduction in interest expenditures, augmented with the 
MNB deficit, in 2002 and 2003 was able to offset this or to reduce the overall expenditure 
(and deficit). In consequence, the amount of corporate subsidies and the volume of fixed 
public investment had to be reduced in 2003. Reduction in fixed investment proved, 
however, temporary, as fixed investment started to increase in 2004, when indirect taxes 
(mainly VAT and excise duties) were raised.  
Trends in revenue reveal that, except for a few years, revenues from taxes and 
contributions declined steadily before 1997, and then they remained broadly flat until 2002. 
In the wake of the tax cuts in 2002 Q4, revenue fell below an earlier unchanged level. 
Raises in indirect taxes in 2004 were also able to bring about a turnaround in this change 
only partially.   
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Total revenue Primary revenue Taxes and contributions 
Source: the authors’ own calculations supplementing official statistics  
 
Deficit, debts and quasi-fiscal liabilities 
The above changes in revenue and expenditure, excluding temporary impacts and 
augmented by quasi-fiscal items, are only partly reflected in official statistics. The initial 
fiscal position in 2003 and 2004 can be evaluated on the basis of the ESA deficit excluding 
temporary items and including quasi-fiscal items. 
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Table 2 Fiscal indicators 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
 2002 2003 2004 
 fact preliminary 
fact 
projection 
(November issue of 
Report on Inflation)
1. ESA deficit -9.3 -6.2 -5.6 
2. Exclusion of temporary items 2.6* -0.9 -1.0 
3. Quasi-fiscal expenditure -2.3 -1.1 -1.3 
4. Augmented (SNA) deficit 1+2+3 -8.8 -8.2 -7.9 
Memo: stock of quasi-fiscal liabilities 0.1 1.2 2.5 
*Subsequent payment of quasi-fiscal liabilities  
ESA deficit incorporating temporary impacts (see Row 2), e.g. discretionary delays in 
refunding VAT, do not reflect the fact structural tax revenues58 fell below earlier levels in 
2003, or that, despite increases in indirect tax rates in 2004, they approximate this level only 
slowly. Nor do ESA statistics on revenue for 2004 necessarily correspond to the 
‘underlying’ level that would follow from trends. The reason for this is that they depend on 
whether or not delayed VAT refunds will be reversed after its postponement beyond the 
statutory deadline during the period serving as the basis for simple cash-adjusted accrual 
accounting (i.e. in January and February 2005).  
Since, for the time being, the ESA deficit does not reflect quasi-fiscal expenditure (see Row 
3), official statistics suggest lower corporate subsidies and government fixed investment 
than what, in effect, the case is (e.g. losses incurred by MÁV (Hungarian Railways) and 
BKV (Budapest Mass Transport Company), delayed payments, PPP-type outsourcing59). In 
the light of this, the adjusted fiscal position (see Row 4), an indicator of trends, amounted 
to 7.9% of GDP even in 2004.  
Public debt is slightly below 60%, which, compared to the average debt of new member 
states, is high. Accordingly, so is the proportion of interest expenditures. By contrast, the 
stock of contingent liabilities (guarantees) is much lower than the average of new EU 
member states.60 Since the most recent instance of debt assumption (at end-2002), the 
stock of (only formally contingent) liabilities arising from quasi-fiscal expenditure (MÁV, 
BKV and PPP fixed investment) was still below earlier levels in 2004 (see Table 2, memo 
item). 
                                                 
58 In 2003, because of the scheduling of VAT refunding (i.e. its postponement until 2002 and 2004 
respectively), revenue looked 1% of GDP more favourable than did its ‘underlying’ level. 
59 Public Private Partnership, i.e. fixed investment and operation financed through the inclusion of private 
capital. For a detailed treatment of PPP, see IMF (2004b). For a brief overview of the topic, see Section 4.4 in 
the MNB’s November 2004 issue of Report on Inflation.  
60 For the stock of guarantees in the other new member states, see S&P: ‘Fiscal Challenges for Acceding 
Countries’ (14 April 2004). 
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Institutional issues 
As regards the initial situation, the institutional framework of the budget (i.e. planning, 
legislation and implementation) carries significant risks. Both our own experience (P.Kiss, 
1998, ÁSZ (State Audit Office) 2004) and international comparison suggest that Hungary is 
in an unfavourable situation61. Based on a single indicator, Hungary only slightly falls 
behind EU average or that of a few candidate countries (Yläoutinen 2004); however, overall 
indices computed by the ECB reveals that Hungary only ranks higher than Romania (see 
Gleich, 2003).62 Comparisons point to the fact that a higher degree of decentralisation may 
contribute to higher deficit. (Yläoutinen 2004)63
As a rule, deficit targets and actual outturns have a systematic difference, and may amount 
to several percentage points of GDP. Average deviation from continuously higher targets 
set by Pre-Accession Economic Programmes was also above 1.6% of GDP during the 
period between 2001 and 2003, which was only exceeded by Greece (1.97%)64 among 
EU15. Such significant slippage was attributable partly to the upward revision or 
assumption of quasi-fiscal items, which is, however, only a seemingly one-off transaction. 





                                                 
61 Before 1998, certain studies (Branson, Macedo and von Hagen, 1998) ranked Hungary as one in the mid 
league among both the CEECs under review (Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and EU member 
states, where it preceded Greece, Portugal and Spain. Within an index comprising four components, the 
centralisation of implementation represented the highest value (12, the maximum being 16), which looks 
unrealistic, given the degree of autonomy of local governments and budgetary units. 
62According to a simple comparison, which used the role of the minister of finance as approximation to the 
degree of the centralisation of fiscal processes, of the 25 EU member states, Hungary ranked as 3 to 5,  15 to 
18 and 24 to 25, in that order, as regards decision making, legislation and implementation respectively. Based 
on this comparison, as for decision making, Hungary only precedes Bulgaria, in respect of legislation, 
however, it comes before both Bulgaria and Romania. The ECB also studied these three stages (decision-
making, legislation and implementation), only it employed 13 different criteria. Of 10 countries, Hungary 
ranked  as 6 to 7, 6 and 9, in that order, as regards decision making, legislation and implementation 
respectively; overall, based on an average of these 13 criteria, it ranked 9.  
63 The centralisation of the budgetary process may be of key importance. One common approach relies on 
commitment, which means that at the start of the budgetary process the various ministers agree on targets 
and legally binding limits on budgetary aggregates. Under another standard approach, significant powers are 
delegated to the prime minister or the minister of finance in budgetary matters. There is also a less common 
practice of decentralisation called the ‘feudal system’, under which the autonomy of ministries implementing 
expenditure is significant; however, there is no mechanism that would allow for the possibility of taking into 
account the objectives of the budget as a whole. The deficit in percentage of GDP of the latter countries was 
3.8% in contrast with the 2.2% deficit of more centralised countries. The difference is especially striking 
under the commitment-based approach, in which case average deficit amounted to 1.6%.  
64 See Box 9 in the September 2004 issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. Data for Greece are unlikely to 
reflect the most recent upward adjustment of the deficit. Comparison can only be made in a rough and ready 
manner, since in the case of EU member states it was the 1999-2003 Convergence Programmes, whereas in 
the case of Hungary it was PEPs that served as references against which the meeting of the deficit target 
could be checked. In our case, the one-off debt assumption in 2002 represents an apparent upward bias; in 
effect, its extent comes close to the amount of the off-the-budget quasi-fiscal activities during the period 
between 1999 and 2003.   
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Deviation was also attributable to the characteristics of planning; some open-ended 
expenditure plans (e.g. pensions and medicine, etc), for example, usually turn out to be 
over-optimistic. As for revenue, plans are pessimistic in some years and optimistic in 
others, for which the underlying reasons include an inaccurate projection for the base year, 
projections for the expected macro-path and the efficiency of official measures (e.g. the 
efficiency of collection). Pessimistic revenue projections were often the results of the 
undershooting of inflation (as was the case in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2001), which only 
allowed for moderated growth in expenditure appropriation. Optimistic revenue 
projections (as was the case in 2003 and 2004) allowed for the possibility of delays in 
adjustment of the increasingly determined expenditure appropriations; curbing them would 
have been a necessary measure in the interest of major reduction in the deficit. 
A third cause of the deviation is the legislation phase, when deficit targets do not change 
formally; nevertheless, the likelihood of achieving them may diminish as excess expenditure 
that is certain to materialise is occasionally offset by more uncertain items.  
Finally, deviation can, to a large extent, also be ascribed to the relatively large flexibility that 
local governments, budgetary units and the government have in the implementation phase. 
What made across-the-board discretionary spending possible in 2002 was an amendment 
under which deficit was allowed to deviate from the approved target to an extent 
amounting to 5% of total expenditure without a draft supplementary budget having to be 
submitted. Effective from 2005, a further amendment stipulates that in the event that such 
deviation amounts to 2.5%, the approval of the Parliament shall be obtained. 
III. 2. 2. Fiscal outlook  
In respect of the ESA deficit, the initial year-2004 situation is unlikely to be significantly 
different from what is included in the updated Convergence Programme; however, only 
after March and September 2005 respectively can a more definitive assessment be made. 
The impacts of current temporary measures (e.g. discretionary delays in VAT refunding) 
and quasi-fiscal items point to a higher future ESA deficit. Furthermore, other future 
impacts, e.g. legislative decisions and impacts attributable to Hungary’s EU accession, must 
also be taken into account. We assume that the effects of these factors, which, overall, add 
to the deficit, will be offset by stronger consolidation measures. If this turns out to be the 
case, the deficit will be reduced to some extent by savings from interest expenditures. 
A standard method of quantifying determinants is the establishment of a risk-based path 
assuming an unchanged fiscal policy. Under this method, the regulations governing projections 
stipulate that, in addition to the impact of macro-economic trends on taxes and that of 
automatic budgetary responses and indexing mechanisms of expenditure, the impact of 
legally approved and/or detailed measures can be taken into account when a risk-based 
scenario is presented. In other words, this method assumes that no further measures, 
increasing the deficit, will be taken during the years for which no approved budgets are 
available either in order to improve the deficit situation or for other reasons. This is 
different from a risk-based path of the ‘worst-case scenario’ (since there will always be 
further upward risks to the deficit). Rather, it only contains a certain range of highly 
probable risks. 
As we have no complete macro-economic projection for the entire period leading up to 
2008, we employ a simplified version of this rule-based method in assuming that, unless 
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measures are taken, tax revenues as a proportion of GDP will not change65. We will revisit 
the issue of uncertainty arising from this assumption later in this study.  
We also allow for the fact that there are expenditure items over which the government 
have no full control. They include, for instance, the expenditure of local government and 
budgetary units with a certain degree of autonomy, for which estimates must allow for past 
trends, as well as interest expenditures, which can be assessed on the basis of the forward 
yield curve and the consolidation path. Though incorporating consolidation expectations 
runs counter to the principles of the rule-based path, we did not wish to provide too many 
scenarios for interest expenses (see Appendix). A new impact, independent of fiscal policy 
and hard to quantify, the impact of Hungary’s EU accession on the budget should also be 
taken into consideration. Based on these principles, a fiscal risk, compared to an established 
deficit target and not yet covered by fiscal measures, can be quantified at a given time. 
The coverage of budgetary items determined by existing legislative decisions is relatively 
narrow over the medium term. The reason for this is that decisions are mostly made a 
given fiscal year. Rarely are they made on measures to be taken in years to come. Naturally, 
the impact of measures taken in a given year may have a full-year effect on the following 
period, as is the case with across-the-board wage increases or increase in surviving spouse’s 
pension, full-year effect on the following year, or with the most recent instance of 
corporate tax preference, which will exert its impact gradually over the years to come. 
There are examples of such statutory measures or measures stipulated by the National 
Council of Collective Conciliation (OÉT) that are in force for several years, e.g. the gradual 
introduction of the 13-month pension and the abolition of health care contribution. 
Furthermore, the disappearance of the impact of temporary measures will have to be taken 
into account in the years to come. Such measures taken to improve the deficit temporarily 
included the discretionary postponement of refunding VAT until the statutory deadline in 
2003, the discretionary temporary delays in refunding VAT beyond the statutory deadline 
in 2004 and the discretionary postponement of the payment of the 13-month wages from 
2004 to 2005. It should also be borne in mind that measures affecting expenditure may 
automatically affect revenue and vice versa. Thus, for instance, the postponement of the 
payment of the 13-month wages reduces both expenditure and revenue by 0.5% and 0.1 to 
0.2% of GDP respectively. This only affects one single year; then, with the year gone, the 
former status quo is restored, i.e. other discretionary expenditures66 and other revenues are 
likely to be the same as before. 
                                                 
65 Over a longer time horizon, the nominally determined features of the budget, e.g. lump-sum taxes and tax 
brackets, may also pose a problem. According to a rule-based projection they would not change under the 
baseline scenario, thus, all these nominal components would generate a major loss of revenue, because of 
taxes (e.g. excise duties); simultaneously, because of bracket-creeping effects of fixed tax brackets, they would 
mean excess revenue in the case of income tax revenues. For reasons of simplicity, we apply the principle of 
‘neutral policy’ to such a case, i.e. we assume the valorisation of nominal features.   
66 The so-called discretionary expenditure is non-determined expenditure, i.e. total expenditure less of interest 
rate, pension-related and NATO-related expenditures as well as the minimum expenditure related to the EU, 
determined by additionality, EU funds and related co-financing. 
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Total revenue 43.6 43.7 0.1 
Health care contribution 0.8 0.0 -0.8 
Customs duties 0.2 0.1 -0.1 
EU-related revenue  0.8 1.7 0.9 
Other revenue 41.8 41.9 0.1 
Total expenditure 49.0 49.6 0.6 
Fixed EU-related expenditure* 4.6 5.9 1.3 
Interest expenditures 4.4 3.9 -0.5 
Pensions 9.2 9.0 -0.2 
NATO-related obligations 1.7 1.8 0.1 
Other discretionary expenditure 28.5 28.1 -0.4 
Of which, local governments spending  11.5 11.7 0.2 
Changes with no measures taken    0.5 
Of which, deterioration in the primary 
balance  
  1.0 
*EU-related expenditure, transfers and expenditures covered by co-
financing, supplemented with average minimum expenditure due to 
additionality.  
Our calculations are fundamentally influenced by the fiscal impact of Hungary’s EU 
membership. We took into account official projections, made after accession negotiations, 
for transfers between the EU and Hungary only for the period until 2006; as for the 
periods to follow, we assumed that changes would be less rapid67.  
In 2005 and 2006 the use of EU funds will still serve as replacement for earlier expenditure, 
since the extent of additionality established for this period is low.68 Our table of 
determinants includes the category of what is called fixed EU-related expenditure, which is 
the sum total of EU-related expenditure, average minimum expenditure due to 
additionality, EU funds used up and co-financing. In our interpretation the impact of the 
replaced portion of expenditure means that the range of other discretionary expenditure 
items may shrink as a proportion of GDP even if consolidation measures are not taken. 
Later, however, due to a higher extent of additionality, excess expenditure will increase the 
deficit. As, however, for the time being, we have no knowledge of the degree of the 
increase, we assume that the actual limits of additionality may remain insignificant.    
                                                 
67 In 2005 the balance of transfers between the EU and the general government will remain slightly positive; 
however, compared to 2004, deterioration in it may amount to 0.2% of GDP. Add to this a 0.1% increase in 
co-financing. By contrast, the balance may improve by as much as 0.1% in 2006, most of which will, 
however, be offset by increasing co-financing.  
68 Additionality means that EU structural funds cannot replace member states’ general government or other 
corresponding structural expenditure. 
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 As regards fixed investment expenditure, a stable GDP ratio can be assumed only if 
increasing EU financing and co-financing allow for the possibility of internal re-
arrangements. Barriers to this include the reference values established by the EU for 
measuring additionality, the autonomy of local governments in fixed investment activities 
and the proportion of postponed fixed investment (in areas such as health care and rail 
services). As for automatic budgetary measures, we only anticipate the index linking of 
pensions to wages and pension inflation. We could not take into account such 
determinants that arose from specific legislation (e.g. the Act on Education) or the tasks of 
and normative sums granted to local governments. Although the latter two may represent 
determinants of local government subsidies, they do not affect final expenditure (i.e. local 
governments’ operational expenses and fixed investment expenditure) directly. 
In the case of local governments and budgetary units with some degree of autonomy and with no 
automatic government control over them we allow for both government subsidies and past 
trends. Such uncontrolled items include the operational expenditures, fixed investment, 
sales and fee revenues as well as sales of assets in this category. Local governments’ 
standard behaviour, e.g. the impact of local elections, should also be taken into account. 
During the two years immediately following such elections expenditure is consistently low; 
fixed investment activity is more buoyant in the next two, however. Such an impact, which 
would add to deficit, will not materialise in 2008 as it is not an election year.  
To sum up, the categories of expenditure determinants and the fiscal impact of Hungary’s 
EU membership will have deteriorated the primary balance by 1% of GDP by 2008. (Table 
3) 
The question may arise how changes in the macro-economic path are likely to affect the 
results. In providing a projection for revenues, we accorded very low likelihood to indirect 
revenues from faster economic growth in connection with Hungary’s EU accession, 
consistent with the fact that our projection also allowed for a moderate increase in fixed 
investment. Naturally, if we established a high reference value for additionality, economic 
growth and tax revenues would also be higher; this, however, could offset the deficit-
increasing impact of resultant excess fixed investment expenditure only to a small extent 
Furthermore, consolidation measures also exert both direct and indirect impacts on macro-
variables such as wages, consumption and fixed investment. Curbing expenditure 
automatically decreases revenues through its direct tax content. Over the short term, the 
indirect impacts of reduction in expenditure also decrease revenues through curbing 
domestic demand.69 By contrast, fiscal consolidation focussing on structural measures may 
even increase potential GDP; however, the analysis of such a scenario has not been 
included in the objectives of this study. 
With the primary balance calculated, we now turn to providing a projection for interest 
expenditures. Interest expenditures are, in part, still determined in 2005 and 2006; as, 
however, we follow the time horizon further on, we can only provide an estimate for an 
increasingly large portion of them. Assuming that fiscal consolidation does occur, 
diminishing interest expenditures are expected to account for savings amounting to a total 
of 0.5% of GDP before 2008, which may edge up even to 0.9% under a very favourable 
                                                 
69 For purposes of providing an illustration of magnitude, we wish to point out that, according to an earlier 
simulation that we performed , 1% GDP-proportionate fiscal contraction generates an approximately 25 or 
1/3 decrease in GDP during the first year. This, in turn, means that GDP-proportionate revenue also 
declines by at least 0.1%. 
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scenario (Tardos, 2004, see Appendix)70. We did not quantify an interest rate path 
associated with an unchanged fiscal policy, since in this case not only debt, but also yields 
would be higher. In addition, it is difficult to provide an estimate for the extent of the latter 
It should be emphasised that the figures presented do not include any quasi-fiscal items, 
which are reflected in the official deficit only upon subsequent debt assumption and which, 
nevertheless, influence demand continuously. Apparently, such items are under no full 
government control. In effect, however, they are associated with subsidies, granted to 
finance loss-making companies (e.g. MÁV and BKV), fixed investment and loans, that are 
of quasi-fiscal nature, as they are provided under government control and with a 
government guarantee. Nor does unchanged fiscal policy mean in this case that, with the 
effect of current decisions worn off, these items disappear. If this were the case, we would 
have an identical assumption of fixed investment and subsidies to corporations, which are 
included in the budget with an identical content. Accordingly, based on past trends, these 
items should be estimated at a level that can be financed. The problem is that, depending 
on the type of financing, quasi-fiscal activities are reflected in official accounts at different 
intervals. Debt assumption occurs as an “extraordinary event” every few years. 
Disbursements related to PPP’s involving private financing are on a continuous basis and 
spread over time. 
 
                                                 
70 The calculations in this paper yield values lower than the ones in a study by Orbán and Szapáry (2004). The 
latter puts improvement in the interest balance position arising from yield convergence at 1 to 2.1/ in 
Hungary. A major portion of the difference is attributable to the fact that the authors quantified the fall in 
interest expenses relative to the 2003 the interest balance position; they expect a 0.5 to 1.6 fall in the interest 
balance compared to the 2004 balance. The remaining portion of difference can be ascribed to the fact that 
the rule of thumb in the study referred to above does not allow for the fact that the interest burden on fixed-
rate bonds which have already been issued, but which will not mature before 2009 is determined, or the fact 
that fall in the interest balance interacts with the debt path.  
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How much consolidation can be generated by curbing expenditure? An example  
Given the initial situation, the risk-based path, which allows for the determinants presented 
and no measures taken, would reveal further deterioration until 2005 and 2006, then slow 
improvement. Without any further adjustment, the ESA deficit would, even under a 
favourable scenario, i.e. with interest expenditures falling, grow by 0.5% prior to 2008 and, 
within this, the primary balance would deteriorate by 1%. 
If, consistent with the baseline scenario, the deficit situation improved at the same rate as 
targeted in the updated Convergence Programme, the deficit should be 2.5 percentage 
points lower, which, based on determinants, would require 3-percentage point 
improvement in the primary balance. If this were concentrated on the expenditure side, due 
to the tax content of this expenditure, reduction in public spending amounting to 
approximately 4% of GDP would be necessary71. This exceeds the reduction in primary 
expenditure experienced in EU countries prior to their EMU entry. 
The introduction of a budget rule in the case of expenditure (covering a wide range of 
discretionary expenditures) could be a component of the reform of budgetary institutions.72 
Of budgetary expenditure item, the rule could govern all discretionary (non-determined) 
expenditure items. In this case, some realistically sustainable ceiling should be introduced 
on aggregate increase in these expenditure items. For instance, it could be stipulated that 
growth in aggregate expenditure should not exceed inflation.  
In our estimate, discretionary (non-determined) expenditure items may account for 28% of 
GDP in 2008 (see Table 3). Compared to 2004, 13-month wages, which were temporarily 
excluded from them in 2004, increase expenditure; by contrast, expenditure items replaced 
with EU funds reduce it (see increase in fixed EU-related expenditure), because of the 
currently low value of additionality. 
In respect of expenditure items accounting for 28% of GDP, the rule of keeping real value 
constant would mean that approximately 3.5% average annual economic growth would 
allow for the possibility of 3.7% GDP-proportionate reduction in expenditure, i.e. an 
additional 0.3% could be saved. Due to further risks not taken into account by the baseline 
scenario, this may not be adequate because of the impact of other factors increasing deficit. 
Under our most restrictive assumption, discretionary expenditure includes the direct 
expenditure of local governments and budgetary units, which the central government can 
control indirectly. Budgetary units are more subject to such control, whereas in the case of 
local governments control is indeed more indirect. As discretionary local government 
expenditure (less of estimated expenditure included in fixed EU-related expenditure) may 
amount to nearly 12% of GDP; without this, the category of expenditure to which any rule 
may apply narrows to 16%. For an expenditure rule to fully apply, an internal pact between 
the central government and local governments, an example of which can be found in 
several EU member states, ought to be made. 
                                                 
71 The tax content of government expenditure (e.g. income tax, contributions and VAT), which translates into 
a loss of revenues on the revenue side, must also be taken into consideration.  
72 A similar attempt was a few years ago the raising of the issue of adjusting public sector wages to half of 
economic growth rate. Although this attempt did not lead to the formulation of any official rule, it was 
reflected in the agreements concluded with trade unions (e.g. in 2001). 
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Sources of further uncertainty  
Relative to the baseline scenario, of the risks emerging, difference in interest expenditures may 
point to two directions. One is that yield convergence and decline in expenditure may be 
favourable to the extreme.73 However, a back-loaded fiscal consolidation and/or more 
partial yield convergence may add to the need for consolidation.  
A further risk that is difficult to quantify and that points to a higher deficit is expected 
developments in the cyclical component. The evaluation of the impacts of the business 
cycle on the general government position will be based on an estimate by the Commission, 
which takes into consideration the average cyclical sensitivity of the budget. As it has also 
been pointed out by the Commission, this method cannot be applied satisfactorily to what 
is called atypical situations.74 In an atypical situation the composition of the business cycle 
is different from average composition; for instance, when either internal or external 
demand exerts a dominant impact. The period between 2002 and 2003 was an example of 
the former, while 2004 is likely to have been an example of the latter. In cases like this, the 
method of desaggregation, in a breakdown by tax base categories, can be applied to the 
situation at hand.75 The identification of such situations is crucial as wages and 
consumption, due to a higher tax burden, play a more important role among the revenues 
of the budget than in GDP. As the Convergence Programme also suggests that wages and 
consumption will grow at a slower pace than will GDP in the years to come, based on the 
composition effect, GDP-proportionate revenues may decline. Therefore, this poses the 
risk that, unlike the period between 2002 and 2003, the coming years may see the business 
cycle exert a negative rather than a positive impact on the general government position 
despite a relative favourable turn (i.e. growth) in GDP; in order that objectives can be 
attained, this may necessitate a more significant structural fiscal adjustment than what is 
presented in the baseline scenario, with the difference amounting to even 0.6 of GDP.  
Furthermore, EU transfers pose an upside risk to the deficit. If EU transfers to the budget 
exceed our conservative estimate, they will not improve the deficit position on average, 
since, faced with the limits of additionality, they will mean excess expenditure during the 
period as a whole. Depending on future additionality values, this may further deteriorate 
the balance. Deficit is further increased by co-financing, the impact of which is, however, 
somewhat offset by excess tax revenues.  
Developments in creative and quasi-fiscal items are a source of further downward and 
upward risks. The official (ESA) deficit situation cannot be improved continuously 
compared to the ‘underlying’ deficit, the latter including a wider range of government 
liabilities from an economic point of view (e.g. formally contingent liabilities, losses 
generated by state-owned companies, other quasi-fiscal activities and deferred payments). 
In consequence, in establishing a medium-term path, we should allow for the risk posed by 
the fact whether or not deferred payments and quasi-fiscal items, excluded from official 
recording earlier, are sustainable in the period under review, or they will occasionally be 
                                                 
73 The fall in interest expenditures under the most favourable scenario as presented in the Annex amounts to 
0.9% of GDP, which does not differ significantly from the amount of savings assumed as a baseline scenario 
in the Convergence Programme.  
74 European Commission (2000) “Public finances in EMU – 2000” Report of the Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, No. 3.  
75 Such methods include the one employed by the ECB and our own method (PF-MCHP). See P.Kiss-Vadas, 
“Mind the gap – watch the ways of cyclical adjustment of the budget balance”, MNB Working Papers, 7/2004. 
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included in ESA accounts as, for instance, debt assumption.76 If the latter is the case, the 
need for adjustment may be greater than that outlined in the baseline scenario.  
On the other hand, these items may be financed continuously from outside the budget 
until 2008, especially if newer forms of quasi-fiscal activities become more relevant.77 Based 
on the experience of other countries, they may include the spread of government 
obligations over a longer term, i.e. 10 to 20 years. This may be true for PPP fixed 
investment, which, though it does not alter the present value of liabilities, it may mean a 
lower level of obligations over a horizon of a couple of years. We wish to emphasise that if 
quasi-fiscal activity remained unchanged at the current level or even heightened, this would 
make continuous reduction in the deficit in the longer run (after 2008) and the 
establishment of a balanced position stipulated by SGP significantly more difficult. 
III. 2. 3. Aspects of quality of adjustment  
As we noted in the introduction, the manner in which measures aimed at consolidation are 
implemented is of key importance to macro-economic effects. Short-term and long-term 
impacts of these measures may be significantly different. 
A favourable scenario could materialise if, rather than temporary and formal measures, 
structural measures, i.e. sustainable measures improving quality and, hence, long-term 
growth, were a main factor of consolidation. Although these incur excess expenditure (e.g. 
dismissal pay and fixed investment), overall, they improve the ratio of productive 
expenditure, the importance of which was also highlighted in Report on Public Finances in 
EMU in 2004. Some international organisations, e.g. the OECD and the IMF, formulated 
even more concrete proposals for measures aimed at fiscal consolidation in Hungary. They 
also underscore the importance of the aspects of quality, such as reducing the distorting 
impact of taxes and increasing the productivity of general government expenditure, which 
influence longer-term economic growth.78 As regards the productivity of expenditure, a 
number of structural problems can be pointed out, e.g the low proportion of health care-
related fixed investment within fixed investment as such. The estimated size of under- and 
overfinancing may, however, grow further if insufficient fixed investment in transport (e.g. 
the upgrading of the road and railway networks) and environment protection is taken into 
consideration. The productivity of expenditure could be greatly enhanced if savings 
attributable to structural measures were used to increase such expenditure79. 
Longer-term growth will be favourably influenced by an upswing in infrastructural fixed 
investment boosted by EU financing. However, given that there will be loss of tax content 
even four years’ savings in the case of primary expenditure are unlikely to be adequate for 
the sustainable consolidation.  
                                                 
76 The question is when the debt of state-owned companies and loans (e.g. to the agrarian sector) granted 
against government guarantee are recorded as expenditure in the budget. Such debt was last assumed in 2002 
(for the stock accumulated since then, see memo items in Table 2). 
77 It should be borne in mind, however, that some of the quasi-fiscal items are also borderline cases 
statistically. Later, subject to decisions on the ESA methodology, they may be subsequently included in the 
deficit of the relevant year. 
78 A recent analysis by the IMF (IMF 2004a) proposes a 3.1 to 3.6 reduction on the expenditure side. The 
introduction of co-payment, according to the IMF study, could improve the balance of health care by 0.5% of 
GDP.  
79 Naturally, productivity also grows if such excess expenditure is financed through PPPs. The only problem 
is that in this case the excess burden imposed by this remains hidden in the short run, since there is no 
change statistically in the deficit position. 
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The requirement to reduce the deficit on a continuous basis also restricts the possibility of 
sustainable tax cuts. Tax competition is less relevant in the case of taxes and contributions 
paid by households. As the distortion impact of the tax regime is not, in itself, linked with a 
high ratio of centralisation (average tax burden), rather, it is attributable to uneven 
distribution and high marginal tax burden; thus, in principle, the distortion impact can be 
reduced even if revenues remain unchanged80. Despite high VAT rates, revenues are 
relatively low, because of tax evasion.81 The efficiency of the tax regime could be improved 
through a gradual narrowing of tax benefits and the widening of the tax base; meanwhile, 
revenues may also be increased to a minimum extent if needed. Within this increase, the 
reform of co-payment due from those relying on government services could qualify as a 
structural measure.  
Implementing structural measures may be time-consuming and expensive, however, formal 
and temporary ones not only cause a delay in actual adjustment and carry the risk of a 
potential reversing, but they may also result in certain shortcomings, as also pointed out by 
the State Audit Office, in project and institution financing as well as PPP’s.  
One type of temporary measures is the collection of one-off revenues another is the 
postponement of expenditure and projects. The latter can be achieved through the curbing 
of expenditure outlined above, which, unlike reforms, only lead to underfinancing. 
Postponing fixed investment may generate temporary savings; however, a mandatory 
minimum requirement (i.e. additionality) of EU-financed (and co-financed) fixed 
investment and a high proportion of autonomous local government fixed investment 
restrict such postponement.  
Formal measures and creative accounting have their limitations, and the ESA deficit 
position can be improved for only a limited period of time for two reasons. Past experience 
shows that items recorded in accounts other than the official ones (i.e. quasi-fiscal items) 
had to be recognised subsequently as their financing would, sooner or later, face 
constraints. Temporary improvement is also actually limited by the fact that it takes burden 
off the budget inasmuch as it means the ‘outsourcing’ of earlier expenditure. In other 
words, additional quasi-fiscal fixed investment cannot reduce fiscal deficit even in the short 
run. The minimum requirements that we referred to in connection with the EU (the 
volume of fixed investment cannot fall below a certain level and limited corporate 
subsidisation) impose limitations on the outsourcing of earlier expenditure. 
Economically, the problem that quasi-fiscal items pose is that, although they do improve 
the ESA deficit position temporarily, they cannot improve the net present value of future 
taxes and exert an immediate adverse impact on the balance of payments. It is important 
                                                 
80 A high ratio of centralisation is also misleading in a certain sense, as it is closely related to the relatively high 
tax content of government expenditures. For example, taxes and contributions on wages are paid in full in the 
general government, in contrast to the private sector. VAT must be paid on government fixed investment, 
which is not the case in the corporate sector.  
81 Based on the comparisons, effective VAT burden was lower only in Romania. This reflects that high rates 
encourage tax evasion, on the one hand, and that tax authorities were less efficient than in other CEECs, on 
the other hand. The underlying reason for this is that the threshold value above which tax payment is 
mandatory is lower in Hungary; thus, the number of tax residents has always been higher here than elsewhere.  
(Jack, 1996)   
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that this should be taken into account when selecting from among various measures and 
paths.82
Finally, experience (Alesina and Perotti, 1996) reveals that, in order that the results of 
consolidation can be sustained, it is inevitable that institutional solutions should be  
reconsidered. The proposals by both the State Audit Office83 and the IMF ought to be 
taken into account (Allan and Parry, 2003). Thus, for instance, in respect of planning, 
efficiency could be improved through reliable projections included in medium-term budget 
frameworks in a manner that accountability is ensured, a conservative estimate for the base 
year that excludes temporary impacts, the adoption of a consensus macro-path and a 
conservative estimate for the effects of fiscal measures.  
Furthermore, as has been mentioned, uncertainty could be reduced in the legislative stage if 
a budget rule on aggregate expenditure were introduced. At this stage it would be essential 
that a comprehensive and regular analysis of fiscal risks be performed, with special respect 
to quasi-fiscal items, including local governments. Predictability could be increased in the 
implementation stage if an internal pact could be concluded with local governments in 
order to avoid any surprise change in the local deficit.      
Putting an end to quasi-fiscal activities would obviate the need for the adoption of an 
expenditure rule. Therefore, either they ought to be abandoned immediately, which would 
add to the deficit, or limitations, similar to those stipulated by the expenditure rule, ought 
to be put in place in a transparent manner in the case of these items as well. The 
supplementary disclosure of quasi-fiscal liabilities would be crucial, e.g. contingent liabilities 
that are most likely to be paid could be recorded. This would be only informative however, 
if not only changes in them were recorded, but also new liabilities (quasi-fiscal deficit) and 
old ones (debt assumption) were recognised separately.  
 
                                                 
82 Over the longer term, PPP may exert only a minor impact on general government, although, depending on 
costs and efficiency, such an impact may be either favourable or unfavourable. There are international 
examples for both; the risk of an unfavourable impact is on the upside, owing to the fact the short-term 
advantages of reducing the deficit may prove to be more important factor of decisions than longer-term 
implications. 
83 In 2003 the State Audit Office provided a summary of the problems it identified in the planning and 
implementation of the government budget as well as the operational and organisational structure of the 
general government over the past 15 years of pursuing its supervisory activity.  
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Experience related to fiscal adjustments in member states of the euro 
zone 
Examples of unsuccessful adjustment84
Italy 
In the early 90s, Italy had been struggling with a high deficit (over 10 per cent) and a large 
debt (over 100 per cent) for some years. Thus, upon the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1991, it was obvious that major consolidation efforts were required. Contrary to the 
government targets promoted in the early 90s, Italy implemented adjustment based on the 
increase of revenues; while the cyclically adjusted revenues rose by nearly 8 per cent of the 
GDP between 1991 and 1997, the amount of adjusted primary expenditures fell by only 2 
per cent of the GDP (see Chart F-1.). The rate of adjustment was not even-paced. The 
period 1991-1993 was characterised by unsuccessful attempts in cutting expenditure, in 
parallel with major “emergency” tax increases covering basically all tax types. In 1994-1995, 
the government made serious efforts to cut expenditures: in addition to putting a limit on 
government wages, it curbed government purchases and partly reformed the pension 
system; as a result, the cyclically adjusted primary expenditures fell by 2.5 per cent. The 
government, however, implemented tax cuts in the same period, partly in reaction to 
political pressure and partly to counterbalance the adverse impact of the pronounced 
distortion of the tax raise on growth, therefore the primary balance did not improve 
significantly. In consideration of the extremely high interest expenditures, approximating 
10 per cent of the GDP, on the whole, these stringency measures proved to be insufficient. 
Moreover, with a moderate fall in government wages, social expenditures even exceeded 
the average rate for 1990 by a minor amount. The Italian government, however, did not 
undertake to further reform the expenditure side. Nearing the finish line for the fulfilment 
of criteria, Italy made desperate efforts and implemented temporary measures to increase 
revenues in the attempt to reach the 3 per cent rate of the deficit. The true nature of this 
strategy is reflected by the “euro tax” – defining one of the new taxes introduced in 1997, 
expressly intended as a temporary measure. Thus, the over 2 per cent cut in the ratio of 
expenditures to GDP is fully contributed to the improvement of the interest balance; the 
cyclically adjusted primary expenditures remained unchanged in these two years. For the 
purpose of reducing the deficit, in addition to temporary taxes, the Italian government also 
employed certain creative accounting techniques which contributed to the fall in the deficit 
for 1997, in the total amount of roughly 0.7 per cent of the GDP. 
Following the fulfilment of Maastricht criteria, the government was forced to implement 
tax reform – tax cut – which was not accompanied with the reform of expenditures. As a 
result, the primary balance has been gradually worsening since 1997; it decreased by 3.5 per 
cent of the GDP up to 2003. 
                                                 
84 The description of countries relies heavily on the study of von Hagen and his co-authors (2001). 
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Chart F- 1: Cyclically adjusted budget expenditures and revenue - Italy 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco 
Portugal  
Portugal provides the model example of adjustment strategy based on the increase in 
revenue, a rare exception where the cyclically adjusted primary expenditures rose 
considerably in the period 1991-1997. On the whole, the size of the budget increased 
significantly in the 1990s; growth has been continuous since the introduction of the euro 
(see Chart F-2). We must add, nevertheless, that in Portugal the rate of primary 
expenditures to the GDP still remains below the EMU average. 
In the early 90s, Portugal struggled with a high deficit (approx. 6 per cent) and had an 
average debt. The convergence program, approved in 1991, targeted major budgetary 
adjustments; according to the plans, the deficit was to fall below 3 per cent by the end of 
1995. In 1992, wide ranging tax increases were implemented (income tax, indirect taxes) 
with parallel attempts at simplifying the tax system, resulting in a jump in revenue. The 
crisis in 1993, however, obstructed the consolidation process; in addition to falling 
revenues, primary expenditures rose significantly even on a structural level, primarily as a 
result of agricultural and export subsidies. The revived adjustment program of 1994 
targeted the cut in expenditures, primarily the reduction of transfers and government 
wages. Little was implemented of the program; in fact, structural expenditures increased by 
a further 2 percentage points in the reference period, due to e.g. the introduction of 
subsidised home loans. The fact that Portugal reached the 3 per cent in 1997 is related to 
two fundamental factors. Firstly, interest expenditures fell at a rate exceeding the figure in 
Italy – 3.5 per cent of the GDP between 1994 and 1997. Secondly, the tax reforms 
introduced in 1993-1994 played a key role, establishing simpler administration and the of 
the tax bases. In contrast to Italy, in place of temporary measures, the improved efficiency 
of the tax system contributed to the rise in revenues, thus cyclically adjusted revenues have 
not decreased significantly since the establishment of the EMU. Fiscal prudence, however, 
has not been implemented, as indicated by the rise in expenditures since 1997 and the fiscal 
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Chart F- 2: Cyclically adjusted budget expenditures and revenue - Portugal 
 
Source: European Commission, Ameco 
 
Greece 
The example of Greece is noteworthy particularly on the basis of the revision of data 
published in September of 2004, corresponding to approximately a considerable 2 per cent 
rate of the GDP per annum. Consequently, Greece failed to fulfil the 3 per cent deficit 
criterion in the year of the reviewed Maastricht criteria (1999) and ever since. Thus, on the 
basis of freshly published data, the example of Greece may clearly be defined as 
unsuccessful, although the country has implemented major adjustments even with the 
modified data.  
Up to the middle of the nineties, Greece recorded a deficit of over 10 per cent, thus it was 
forced to make extraordinary efforts to fulfil the criterion. The case of Greece is similar to 
Italy and Portugal to the extent that it applied a strategy targeting higher revenue, and the 
improvement of the interest balance significantly contributed to the improved balance. 
However, the problems stemmed from the expenditure side and not the revenue side. In 
other words, it seems that the country succeeded in sustainably increasing revenue in the 
long term which, in addition to the rise in tax revenue, is greatly contributed to the 
sustainable transformation of the tax system. 
From the early 90s, Greece has been reforming the tax system on a regular basis. In 
addition to the increases of direct, indirect taxes and contributions, these measures were 
primarily linked to steps addressing the serious problem of tax evasion and transformation 
targeting the simplification and enhanced progressivity of the tax system. In the period 
1990-1999, the ratio of taxes and contributions to the GDP grew by nearly 10 per cent, 
although it is important to emphasise that the ratio of taxes was very low in European 
comparison, not least because of difficulties related to tax collection (26 per cent of the 
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More modest efforts were made on the expenditure side. Moreover, in 1996-1997, obvious 
expansionary measures were made in relation to transfers and wages85 which contributed to 
the failure in reducing the deficit to appropriate levels by 1997, and by 1999, as indicated by 
new information. 
Thus, on the whole, the adjustments of Greece reveal a mixed picture. The country must 
make serious efforts to fulfil the conditions of the Stability and Growth Pact, primarily in 
the area of expenditures. The expected rise in pension expenditures poses major risks 
which the country can only challenge with the further reform of the pension system. 
Primary expenditures are characterised by the rigidity of government wages and social 
expenditures; the budget does not offer sufficient resources for the management of 
structural problems (e.g. low funds for research and development, high structural 
unemployment). According to the 2003 assessment of the Commission, major efforts must 
be made to establish the sustainability of the budget, particularly in light of the continued 
enormous debt, equalling over 100 per cent of the GDP. 
  
Examples of successful adjustment  
Spain 
The case of Spain is similar to Italy in the sense that most of the adjustments were 
implemented in the final two years – 1996-1997 – since the consolidation package planned 
for the first half of the 90s failed, primarily, similarly to Portugal, in consequence of the 
1992-1993 crisis. In 1993, the budget deficit reached 6.6 per cent of the GDP, primarily as 
a result of the rise in social expenditure, and even with cyclical adjustments, it indicated a 
major worsening in comparison to 1992. In contrast to Italy, however, Spain wished to 
implement the Maastricht target through the wide scale reduction of expenditures which, in 
addition to an improved balance, also included the comprehensive reform of the welfare 
system. Nevertheless, we should add that the debt was much smaller in Spain than in Italy, 
therefore it required a lower primary surplus, although the ratio of interest expenditures  to 
GDP also fell at a smaller rate. 
The ratio of expenditures to GDP decreased on a gradual basis from 1994; the highest fall 
was in 1996-1997 (see Chart F-3). With a view to limiting government wages, the 
government – in agreement with the trade unions – modified the system of wage 
determination, the indexing practice. In agreement with regional governments, the 
government limited health expenditures, although actual expenditures did not fall at a rate 
indicated by official figures due to the above mentioned PPP agreements (Torres and Pina, 
2001). Beyond major stringency measures affecting social benefits – the amount of 
transfers and subsidies fell by 3 per cent of the GDP between 1994 and 1997 – the 
operating costs of government institutions and investment expenditures were also reduced 
at a lower rate. 
                                                 
85 Although from 1994, the Greek government made attempts to curb the rise in government wages, this 
policy became less effective from 1996; in a single year, the number of government employees rose by 1.5 per 
cent. In 1996 family benefits, agricultural subsidies and certain pensions were raised. 
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Chart F- 3: Cyclically adjusted budget expenditures and revenue - Spain 
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The revenue side basically remained stable in the final four years; this trend, however, is 
linked to the tax reforms promoting economic growth. Social security contributions 
payable by employers, for example, were reduced to support the rise in employment; lost 
revenue was supplemented with, for example, the elimination of the tax exemption of 
unemployment and disability aid. 
The adjustment surpassed the fulfilment of the criteria: the cyclically adjusted expenditures 
decreased even after 1997, and Spain practically achieved a budget balance, although the 
assessment of the Commission suggests that the expected rise in pension expenditures 
poses a risk. 
Finland 
Finland and Sweden – although the latter is not an EMU member – are in some respects the 
model examples of the EU, belonging to the few countries in which there is no risk of 
fiscal imbalance, as suggested by the assessment of the Commission. These two countries 
not only confronted the high rate of deficit, but also the level of redistribution, 
uncommonly high on an EU level. In the process of consolidation, the amount of revenue 
and expenditure fell at a parallel rate; beyond the reform of welfare expenditures, major tax 
cuts were implemented. 
Finland is a special case among other member states. The fiscal problems of the country, 
dating back to the early 90s, are primarily linked to the deep economic and bank crisis 
following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The main problem was not only caused by 
the large deficit – although the budget deficit reached roughly 5.5-8 per cent of the GDP in 
1992-1994 – but also the marked growth of the budget, corresponding to over 10 per cent 
of the GDP, which was mostly the result of the fall in the GDP (see Chart F-4). Thus, the 
consolidation package launched in 1993, and boosted in 1995, not only targeted the 
improvement of the balance, but also the implementation of a comprehensive budget 
reform which supports the reduction of the high level of redistribution, allowing, in turn, 
the improvement of the country’s long term competitiveness. In fact, the main objective of 
 54
the adjustment served the stimulation of supply. The major cut in social security 
contributions and taxes on production was, to a lesser extent, enabled by higher revenue 
originating from other – income and indirect – taxes, and to a greater extent, the significant 
reduction of expenditures, encompassing the reduction of unemployment benefits and the 
transformation of the financing system of local governments and the pension system. 
Chart F- 4: Cyclically adjusted budget expenditures and revenue - Finland 
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Table F -1: Total revenue and expenditure, and total and primary balance of the 
budget 
(In percentage of GDP) 
 Total revenue Total expenditure Budget balance Primary balance 
 1990 1994 1997 2002 1990 1994 1997 2002 1990 1994 1997 2002 1990 1994 1997 2002
Euro zone 44.1 46.7 47.5 46.0 48.7 51.8 50.2 48.2 -4.6 -5.1 -2.6 -2.3 -0.1 -0.1 2.5 1.4
Belgium 46.6 48.4 49.5 50.5 53.4 53.4 51.4 50.5 -6.8 -5 -2 0.1 5.1 4.6 6 6.1
Germany  46.6 46.6 45  49 49.3 48.5  -2.4 -2.7 -3.5  0.9 0.9 -0.4
Greece 34.5 40.7 43.7 45.4 50.2 49.9 47.7 46.9 -15.4 -9.4 -4 -1.4 -6 3.1 4.2 4.7
Spain 39.5 40.8 38.6 39.8 43.4 47.3 41.8 39.7 -3.9 -6.5 -3.2 0 -0.8 -1.5 1.6 2.8
France 48.6 49.4 51.8 50.3 50.7 54.9 54.9 53.5 -2.1 -5.5 -3 -3.2 0.3 -2.4 0.7 -0.2
Ireland   38.6 33.1   37.1 33.3 -2.8 -2 1.2 -0.2 5.1 4.1 5.3 1.2
Italy 42.6 45.3 48.4 45.1 54.3 54.6 51.1 47.6 -11.8 -9.3 -2.7 -2.3 -1.3 2.1 6.7 3.5
Netherlands 49.4 50.1 47.1 45.9 54.8 53.6 48.2 47.5 -5.3 -3.5 -1.1 -1.9 0.5 2.3 4.1 1.2
Austria 50.6 52.4 52.1 51 53.1 57.4 54.1 51.3 -2.4 -5 -1.9 -0.2 1.6 -0.9 2 3.1
Portugal 35.5 38.3 41.2 43.2 42.1 46 44.8 46 -6.1 -6.6 -3 -2.7 2.0 -1.1 0.7 0.3
Finland 54 57.2 55.2 54.4 48.6 62.9 56.4 50.1 5.3 -5.7 -1.5 4.3 6.7 -1.5 2.7 6.5
Sweden  61.7 62 58.4  70.9 63 58.3  -10.5 -1.5 0  -4.1 4.8 2.9
England 40.7 38.2 38.9 39.4 42.2 45 41.1 40.7 -1.5 -6.7 -2 -1.6 2.2 -3.4 1.7 0.5
Source: New Cronos 
 
Table F -2:  Gross debt and interest expenditure 
(In percentage of GDP) 
 Gross debt Interest expenditure 
 1991 1997 1991 1995 1997 
EMU12 58.6 75.4 5.2 5.4 4.9 
Belgium 130.9 124.8 11.9 9.3 8 
Germany 40.4 61.0 2.6 3.7 3.6 
Greece 82.2 108.2 10 11.2 8.3 
Spain 44.3 66.6 3.9 5.2 4.8 
France 35.8 59.3 2.9 3.8 3.7 
Ireland 102.9 65 7.9 5.4 3.8 
Italy 100.6 120.2 10.5 11.5 9.4 
Netherlands 76.9 69.9 5.9 5.9 5.2 
Austria 57.5 64.7 4.1 4.4 4 
Portugal 60.7 59.1 8.6 6.3 4.2 
Finland 22.6 54 1.4 4 4.2 
Sweden 51.3 70.5 4.8 6.6 6.3 
England 54.9 50.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 
Source: New Cronos 
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Anticipated impact of EU accession on the budget deficit  
Several studies have analysed the effects of accession, preparing estimates on different time 
horizons, on the basis of various approaches. The first group of calculations focused on the 
period extending from 2004 to 2006; other studies examined medium-term effects (after 
2006). 
The calculations cover the various levels of budgetary impacts and their different 
groupings. The classification we propose operates with four impact levels. The first level 
corresponds to the balance of direct settlements between a member state and EU, the 
second one supplements the first level with impacts closely linked to accession (e.g. 
reduction in the rate of customs duties), the third level is related to wider ranging yet direct 
impacts, and the fourth level also indicates the estimates of indirect impacts. 
The first major difference in the applied methodologies is associated with different effects 
of accession on the levels of the total economy and the government sector. The net balance 
of EU related financial settlements is seemingly simply defined, but in fact several 
problems arise. 
All approaches agree that funds received by the agriculture are excluded from the balance 
of the government. But certain calculations (Antzak, 2003) also exclude a considerable rate 
of structural expenditures when calculating the net balance of the government. 
The loss in national customs duties poses an additional problem. This loss has two 
components. Firstly, some of the revenues are lost in full due to the reduction in the 
general rate of customs duties, while the remaining part is deemed EU revenue. In the 
classification we propose, the first effect is manifested on the second level of impacts, 
while the second effect – similarly to the tables related to the Copenhagen Treaty – is 
indicated on the first level of settlements. The cited studies, however, likely do not 
differentiate between the effects of lost customs duties, therefore in their groupings both 
effects are manifested on the second level of settlement. 
On the third level of impacts, we are considering factors which would have theoretically 
occurred irrespective of the requirements of the EU membership. Such factors include 
extra expenditures related to infrastructure investments and the transformation of public 
administration, elimination of certain producer subsidies and extra revenue arising in 
relation to tax harmonisation. 
Structural EU transfers theoretically require automatic extra expenditures. But this only 
holds true if the agreed levels of additionality is of a high level. In the case of Hungary, 
however, the level of additionality for 2004-2006 was determined at a low rate; therefore all 
estimates on extra expenditures are excessive. Although it is difficult to clearly determine 
the level of additionality (similar data for 2002-2003 is not available), on the basis of 
flexible re-arrengement within investment expenditures, however, expenditures financed by 
the EU do not indicate undue pressure for the time being. We are basing our estimate on 
the simple technical assumption that the rate of effective extra expenditure roughly 
corresponds to the amount of co-financed expenditure. On the other hand, the fall in 
producer subsidies will likely not be of a high rate, for the above amount will mostly be 
counterbalanced with national agricultural subsidies authorised by the EU. In respect of tax 
harmonisation, we considered the revenue of 2004 as a basis, as estimated by the Ministry 
of Finance. 
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The impact, in the broadest sense, encompasses indirect impacts, as well, but it is difficult 
to estimate their joint impact. The automatic impact of actual extra expenditures, financed 
by EU funds, on the increase in tax may be calculated. The interest expenditures of the 
government may fall, but we quantified this effect separately. However, no estimates are 
available regarding the impact of the following factors. The extra investments implemented 
by the private sector may produce a favourable impact on employment and thereby tax 
revenue. Beyond the above, however, with strengthening competition, the private sector 
will have also costs in relation to accession. In respect of Hungary, tax competition may 
have a negative effect on the budget. In the medium term, the improved efficiency of 
public administration may result in savings, but this process will likely involve short term 
expenditures. (For the sake of simplicity, our estimate does not include these effects.) 
Major differences arise when comparing results relating to short term impacts in Hungary. 
Our own estimate, indicating a minimal impact, is of an average rate. The largest negative 
impact is estimated by Antzak; a large amount of revenue is linked to the private sector, 
and in respect of extra expenditures, her estimate does not take into account that the re-
arrengement of expenditures may lead to major reductions in extra expenditures. The 
estimate indicating a positive impact (Hallet) disregards the loss in customs duties, and – 
similarly to our method – only considers co-financing in estimating the size of extra 
expenditures. 
 
Table F-3: Short term fiscal impacts of EU accession* 
(In percentage of GDP) 
 Antzak IMF staff Hallet (EC) Own 
estimate 
Budgetary settlements -0.7 no data 0.9 0.1 
Including closely linked impacts  -1.2 no data no data -0.1 
Including all direct impacts -2.2 -1.0 0.5 -0.3 
Including indirect impacts no data no data no data 0.0 
/*The calculation relates to the year 2006, excluding the Antzak estimate which is linked to 2004-2006.   
 
The medium-term impact on the level of budgetary settlements may be even more 
favourable, although re-arrengement of expenditure would certainly be limited by the levels 
determined by additionality – EU funds may not substitute own expenditures. For the 
above reason, the increasing funds may not improve the deficit, moreover, the higher rate 
of payments to EU and lost customs duties increases the overall deficit. With additional 
costs (co-financing, institutional costs), the government assumes a major burden. Similarly  
to our short term estimate, Backe only takes into account co-financing, and assumes that 
beyond additionality, it is possible to re-arrenge expenditures within the budget, allowing 
the minimising of the negative impact with the above measure and the higher revenues 
produced by larger growth. We did not prepare estimates relating to the medium term, 
because the focus was on the period 2007-2008. These years are still linked to transition. In 
comparison to the broadly neutral short term effects, even a moderately positive budgetary 
impact can occur on a temporary basis, depending on how the average level of additionality 
is determined in relation to the period 2007-2012.  
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Table F-4: Middle term fiscal impacts of EU accession* 
(In percentage of GDP) 
 Kopits-Székely Backe* 
Budgetary settlements 2.8 2.8 
Including closely linked impacts  2.3 2.3 
Including all direct impacts -3.8 -0.6 
Including indirect impacts no data -0.1 
/*No separate calculations are available in Hungary; the average of the given extreme 
values and the corresponding Hungarian value of the Kopits-Székely estimate, used by 
Backe, was used 
 
 
Expected impact of yield convergence on the budget deficit 
The following chapter was prepared on the basis of the study of Tardos (2004). Hungary’s 
accession to EMU is linked to the yield convergence of sovereign Hungarian national debt 
instruments. For the purpose of estimating the impact of yield convergence on the budget 
balance, we examined two alternative versions as to how the improvement of the budget 
balance contributes to the reduction of the deficit required by Maastricht criteria in the 
period up to 2008, projecting the analysis up to the date of accession. 
Our calculations lead us to conclude that in the baseline scenario – if the future trend of 
the interest balance is estimated on the basis of the forward yield curve of January 2005 – 
the interest balance will contribute to the reduction of the ESA 95 deficit level at an 
average annual rate of 0.15 percentage points of the GDP in the period 2005-2010. 
According to an alternative, optimistic scenario, with a maximum estimate – assuming the 
gradual, full elimination of the difference between the HUF and euro yield levels - the 
interest balance will contribute to the reduction of the ESA 95 deficit level at an average 
annual rate of 0.2 percentage points of the GDP in the period 2005-2010. The first 
scenario suggests that the deficit may be reduced by 0.5 per cent of the GDP in the period 
we examined, extending up to 2008. According to the second, optimistic scenario, the fall 
in the deficit may correspond to 0.9 per cent of the GDP by 2008. 
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Table F-5: Presumed change in the interest balance 2005-2010 










2005 2006 2010 2007 2008 2009
Change in interest balance on the basis of forward yield curve Change in interest balance on the basis of gradual convergence of yields 
Cumulated estimation from forward yield curve  Cumulated estimation on the basis of gradual convergence of yields 
We wish to emphasise that the optimistic scenario, in fact, suggests a hypothetical path, the 
probability of which are small. This holds true particularly in light of the past trends of risk 
premium in countries acceding to the euro zone in the past. 
If we examine the final year of the convergence period (between 2005 and 2010) under 
analysis, according to the above scenarios, in reaction to interest convergence related to 
accession to the euro zone, the ratio of interest balance to GDP may fall from the annual 
rate of 4.1 per cent in 2004 to 3.2-2.8 per cent of the GDP in 2010. On the basis of the 
above, we may establish that in comparison to the interest balance of 2004, a much lower 
interest balance is expected by the end of ERM II membership, equalling 0.8-1.3 per cent 
of the GDP; in the next five years, the accumulated change in the interest balance supports 
budgetary adjustments at this rate, as required for fulfilling Maastricht criteria. 
Consequently, in the following years interest convergence will likely contribute to the 
acceleration of fiscal convergence only at a moderate rate. 
On the basis of the yield curve calculated according to the interest path, by 2010, the 
interest balance may contribute 0.8 per cent of the GDP to the fulfilment of Maastricht 
criteria relating to the budget balance. 
The future path of the yield curve we have defined greatly depends on the trend of the 
government balance in the next years. Stringent fiscal policy and sustainable budget 
adjustments may promote the reduction of the risk premium of Hungarian debt 
instruments. Thus, in the optimistic case suggested by the second scenario, the risk 
premium on Hungarian government securities may be gradually eliminated from 2005. 
Assuming that the yield convergence of Hungarian government securities is fully 
implemented by 2010, this scenario suggests that in the final year of the period under 
examination, in 2010 the interest balance will contribute 1.3 per cent of the GDP to the 
fulfilment of Maastricht criteria related to the ESA deficit. 
Our calculations are based on the premises below:  
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− In 2005, the primary balance of the budget is likely to decrease by 0.7% of the GDP. In 
line with the Convergence Report of the Government, published in December of 2004, 
the deficit is then likely to gradually fall over the examined time horizon; at the end of 
the period, we assume that a further improvement of the balance is not expected, under 
the principle of prudent projections. 
− In 2005, foreign exchange bonds are expected to be issued at the net value of 2 billion 
euro; in the subsequent years, foreign exchange issues will likely amount to net 1 billion 
euro annually. As a result, the denomination structure of public debt will shift in the 
short term to a larger rate of foreign exchange, but the weight of foreign exchange debt 
will roughly remain unchanged over the examined time horizon. 
− Similarly to the practice of previous years, the issue of bonds with variable interest rate 
is not expected in the future, and the rate of treasury bills will not rise significantly on a 
nominal level. The Government Debt Management Agency is assumed to satisfy 
financing demand mostly through fixed rate bonds. We expect that bonds with long 
term maturity will play a moderately larger role in financing, with a corresponding fall 
in the rate of bonds with 3 years maturity. 
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